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Abstract
Few quantitative studies exist on tuition reset outcomes despite increasing
frequency and interest among industry practitioners. The purpose of this study is to
examine the relationship between sticker price elasticity and changes in first-year student
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, percent of first-year
students who are Pell-eligible, and changes in transfer student enrollment using
multivariate logistic and linear regression models. The independent variable is the sticker
price elasticity of demand from two years preceding the announcement of a reset.
This study contributes to the literature by adding to evidence regarding the
signaling role of sticker price in higher education and provides a template for future
studies regarding the impact of tuition resets. For industry practitioners, this study
provides an overview of tuition reset outcomes and indicators of the suitability of tuition
resets as a strategy at the institutional level. This study finds sticker price elasticity is a
poor predictor of tuition reset success. Increases to advertising spending and gains in net
assets in the years prior to the reset are more consistent predictors of success. This study
also finds no evidence of a direct correlation or of “threshold effects” between the size of
a reset and the number of first-year students enrolled or net tuition and fee revenue
increases.
The study concludes with applications of findings and recommendations for
future research with emphasis on the role of advertising as a mechanism to explain the
rationale for resetting.
Keywords: Sticker price elasticity, price strategy, tuition elasticity, higher
education pricing, tuition reset, tuition rollback
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Definition of Terms
This study uses the following terms, phrases, and acronyms which are essential for
understanding:
Circular Area Profiles (CAPS)
An application of the Missouri Census Data Center that aggregates data from the
American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census to approximate
circular areas and radius values and provide summary demographic statistics
(Missouri Census Data Center, 2019).
Contact Hour
A period of time consisting of (1) A 50- to 60-minute class, lecture, or recitation
in a 60-minute period; (2) A 50- to 60-minute faculty-supervised laboratory, shop
training, or internship in a 60-minute period; or (3) 60 minutes of preparation in a
correspondence course (NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).
Credence Goods
Credence goods are items in which the benefits are unknown and may never be
fully known (e.g. purchase of insurance, dental work, quality of training product
warranties). They are difficult to evaluate. Credence goods are purchased on the
belief they will deliver a benefit, even if the customer is unaware of its doing so
(Smith, 2017; Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016).
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Discount Rate:
Discount Rate refers to the reduction in costs students pay, expressed as a
percentage of costs. Unless otherwise specified, Discount Rate is assumed to refer
to the NACUBO Discount Rate calculation (described below).
Direct Cost of Attendance (DCOA or Sticker Price):
DCOA is the cost of attendance that is charged directly by the college or
university (e.g. tuition, fees, room and board as published). It does not include
books and supplies (Sallie Mae, 2018). DCOA is also referred to as sticker price.
First-year Student:
A student who has completed less than the equivalent of one full year of
undergraduate work that is less than 30 semester hours (in a 120-hour degree
program) or less than 900 contact hours (NCES National Center for Education
Statistics, 2017).
Form 990:
Tax-exempt organizations are required to file a Form 990 on an annual basis with
the IRS in lieu of a tax return. This information is used by regulators, funders,
journalists and the general public to evaluate the organization’s operational and
financial performance (Blazek & Adams, 2009).
Full-time Student:
Undergraduate: A student enrolled for 12 or more semester credits, or 12 or more
quarter credits, or 24 or more contact hours a week each term. (NCES National
Center for Education Statistics, 2017)
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GuideStar:
GuideStar is a non-profit organization that provides a searchable database of Form
990s and other forms of information on over 2.7 million nonprofits (GuideStar,
2019) to libraries, fundraising organizations, and the general public.
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS):
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System is an NCES database to
which all Title IV receiving institutions must provide accurate data aggregated at
the institutional level. Data is collected via 11 surveys (called catalogs).
National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES):
“The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) is the primary federal
entity for collecting and analyzing data related to education in the U.S. and other
nations. NCES is located within the U.S. Department of Education and the
Institute of Education Sciences. NCES fulfills a Congressional mandate to collect,
collate, analyze, and report complete statistics on the condition of American
education; conduct and publish reports; and review and report on education
activities internationally.”(Institute of Education Sciences, 2018)
National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO):
“The National Association of College and University Business Officers
(NACUBO) is a membership organization representing more than 1,900 colleges
and universities across the country. NACUBO specifically represents chief
business and financial officers through advocacy efforts, community service, and
professional development activities. The association’s mission is to advance the
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economic viability, business practices and support for higher education
institutions in fulfillment of their missions.”(NACUBO, 2018)
NACUBO Discount Rate:
The NACUBO Discount Rate is the percentage of tuition and fees charged given
back in the form of institutional grant aid using both funded and unfunded sources
(NACUBO, 2016). This is the most frequently used form of calculating a discount
rate (Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017).
Net Price:
The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 defines institutional net price as
“the average yearly price actually charged to first-time, full-time undergraduate
students receiving student aid at an institution of higher education after deducting
such aid.” In IPEDS, average institutional net price is generated by subtracting the
average amount of federal, state/local government, or institutional grant and
scholarship aid from the total cost of attendance (NCES National Center for
Education Statistics, 2017).
Overall Discount Rate:
An overall discount rate is the percentage of tuition, fees, room and board charged
given back in the form of institutional grant aid using both funded and unfunded
sources (Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017). This is an important variation on NACUBO
Discount Rate as it assesses discounting against room and board revenues as well.
Price Elasticity:
Price elasticity is a microeconomic concept employed to measure price sensitivity
(Kagan, 2010). Short for price elasticity of demand, price elasticity is the
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percentage change in quantity demanded of a good produced by a one percent
change in its price, holding all other factors constant (Fischer et al., 1988). See
Appendix C for further information.
Room and Board:
Room charges are “the charges for an academic year for rooming
accommodations for a typical student sharing a room with one other student.”
Board charges are “Charges assessed students for an academic year for meals.”
(NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).
Sticker Price:
Sticker price refers to the direct cost of attendance in this study. Indirect costs
such as estimated books and travel expenses are not considered in this study.
Tuition and Fees:
“The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most
frequently charged to students. These values represent what a typical student
would be charged and may not be the same for all students at an institution. If
tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit hour load
for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees
include all fixed sum charges that are required of such a large proportion of all
students that the student who does not pay the charges is an exception.” (NCES
National Center for Education Statistics, 2017)
Tuition Reset:
“A tuition reset is a substantial reduction in a college’s published tuition price—
what people generally think of as its ‘sticker price’ before scholarships and

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

XII

financial aid are awarded. The price reduction typically applies for students
enrolled in on-campus undergraduate programs, as opposed to graduate or onlineonly programs.”(Lawlor, 2016). Frequently, tuition resets do not have a
substantial impact on net price (Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015). Tuition resets
are sometimes referred to as tuition rollbacks.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
J.C. Penney traditionally priced goods at high prices but then provided discounts
to target middle-class consumers who value both quality and savings. However, with
increasing competition from low-price department stores (e.g. Walmart, Target) new CEO
Ron Johnson tried to end coupon discounts and simply offer everyday low prices in 2012.
The results were disastrous. J.C. Penney experienced a 25% loss of sales and a net loss of
$985 million due to management’s failure to understand the J.C. Penney customer
enjoyed the thrill of the hunt for bargains (Aisner, 2013).
In many ways, private not-for-profit colleges face a similar dilemma (Seltzer,
2017a). They depend on a high-price and high-discount pricing model but increasingly
face greater competition from lower-price competitors. Some institutions have found
resetting their tuition led to increased enrollment. Others found implementing the tuition
reset strategy to be a mistake and subsequently implemented material price increases
returning to a high-price and high-discount model. Knowing how price communicates
value to their consumers is critical to selecting an optimal price strategy in a competitive
environment where mistakes threaten institutional viability.
Research Problem
The pricing model of higher education in the United States is under pressure,
especially in the private not-for-profit sector (Casamento, 2016). The Obama
administration introduced a number of initiatives attempting to make college attendance
more affordable including reducing the rates of tuition increases, reducing student debt
and encouraging more transparency on behalf of colleges (Lewin, 2013). In 2017 the
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Chronicle of Higher Education ran an exposé entitled The Tuition Pricing Crisis (Pryor,
2017). The exposé highlighted concerns of politicians, parents, and industry pundits
about the high and rising costs of education. It went on to describe a variety of innovative
approaches colleges and universities are taking to revisit pricing models but concluded
none of the approaches thus far were entirely satisfactory.
The dominant pricing model in the private 4-year not-for-profit sector is tuition
discounting. In conjunction with high sticker prices that traditionally serve as a signal of
quality (Gilmore, 1990), deep discounts are provided to students. The discounts take the
form of institutional scholarships and grants targeted to attract students distinguished by
desirable attributes such as academic merit, athletic ability, or other characteristics used
to shape a class. Discounts are intended to increase the number of students enrolled by
reducing the net price actually paid by the targeted group (Duffy, 2014; Rine, 2016).
Tuition discounts enable colleges to target specific subpopulations of students by
providing scholarships that meet specific criteria (Duffy, 2014; Ehrenberg, 2000).
Despite these benefits, tuition discounting has also been linked to several negative
effects. These risks include publishing an artificially inflated direct cost of attendance
(Rine, 2016) which mask the true price of attendance, also known as net price. Masking
the net price of attendance can discourage families from applying (Davis, 2003;
SallieMae & Ipsos Public Affairs, 2015). High unfunded discount rates can weaken
college budgets (Davis, 2003; Deegan & Deegan, Jr., 2014) and increase the financial
risk of recruitment strategy failure when insufficient numbers of students are recruited to
pay for unfunded discounts (Behaunek, 2015; Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016).
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Excessive pressures to increase discount rates can lead to a tragedy of the
commons problem, a situation where competition deteriorates the health of a competitive
environment (Hardin, 1998). On the one hand colleges and universities feel compelled to
offer ever-higher scholarships and discounts to attract students. NACBUO reported the
national average discount rate for first-year students was 52.2% during the 2018-2019
fiscal year (Valbrun, 2019). On the other hand, many chief financial officers in higher
education wonder if the financial model of their institutions remains viable given the run
of increasing discount rates over the past two decades (Lederman & Seltzer, 2017;
NACUBO, 2016; Rine, 2016), combined with projected declines in the population of
college-going high school seniors (Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education,
2016).
More and more colleges and universities are considering a tuition reset strategy
(Bernard, 2019; Kantrowitz, 2019), up to 20% of private not-for-profit institutions
according to one prominent survey (Pryor, 2017). Within the 2017-2018 academic year
alone, 24 colleges announced plans to reduce tuition for the 2018-2019 academic year
(See Appendix A). Typically, tuition resets are executed as a reduction of the published
sticker price, but with a roughly commensurate reduction in financial aid such that the net
price students pay remains basically the same (Bernard, 2019).
The practical effects of a tuition reset are the subject of ongoing industry debate
(Seltzer, 2017a). Proponents argue tuition resets can make college more affordable and
are more transparent because the difference between published sticker price and what
students actually pay is reduced (Lapovsky, 2015; Toppo, 2019). Critics, however,
question if tuition resets are merely marketing gimmicks without long-term benefit to the
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institution or student (Bloom, 2017; Eldridge & Cawley, 2017; Seltzer, 2017a). Indeed,
some students have ended up paying a higher net price as a result of the tuition reset
(Krupnick, 2016). Newton observes the results of tuition resets have been uneven at best,
on the basis that higher education shoppers make their decisions primarily upon valueshopping (2019).
The study of tuition resets contributes to a wider body of literature regarding
theories of price signaling in service industries under deteriorating conditions. In
situations where potential customers depend upon extrinsic factors to assess the quality of
an offering, price provides an important signal of quality (Nagle et al., 2011; Simon,
2015; Utaka, 2015; Zeithaml, 1988). However, price also represents the monetary portion
of sacrifice in order to enjoy the benefits of using an offering (Nagle et al., 2011; Rao,
2010; Zeithaml, 1988). In the world of higher education, higher prices have generally
been associated with higher quality, (Archibald & Feldman, 2011; Ehrenberg, 2000;
Wright, 2015) but discussions increasingly emphasize cost-related issues such as
affordability, accessibility, and problems associated with student debt.
Institutions considering a tuition reset must navigate a series of paradoxes. As a
signal of quality, lowering the sticker price should not give prospective students an
impression of lower quality. Further, potential new students and their families need to
perceive the institution’s offerings are more affordable even as the net price which signals
fiscal cost remains the same.
Purpose of Research
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between sticker price
sensitivity and changes in first-year student enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from
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first-year students, the proportion of first-year students who are Pell-eligible, and transfer
student enrollment following a tuition reset. In our multivariate logistic and linear
regression models the independent variable of interest is sticker price sensitivity as
measured by the sticker price elasticity of demand (Bradley & Singell Jr., 2010; Farhan,
2016) in the two years prior to the announcement of the reset event. The dependent
variables stemming from industry dialog (Bloom, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky,
2015) are percent change in first-year students enrolled, percent change in net tuition and
fee revenue from first-year students, change in percent of the first-year cohort that is Pelleligible, percent change in transfer students enrolled, likelihood the tuition reset will
increase first-year enrolled, and likelihood the tuition reset will increase net tuition and
fee revenue from first-year students. The effects of increased spending on advertising,
population density, and varied measures of fiscal health are introduced as intervening
variables (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Kumar,
2005; Lapovsky, 2015).
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review
In service industries such as higher education, price can play two communication
roles, both as an indicator of quality and as an indicator of cost. As an industry matures or
transitions to decline, consumers may respond to price messages in different ways. In the
higher education market, sticker price elasticity and net price elasticity are different
considerations. Tuition resets offer a unique lens by which responses to changes in both
sticker price and net price can be investigated. The following literature review funnels
from broad topics of price theory, to the general context of higher education, and then
drills-in to the specific phenomenon of tuition resets. The literature review aims to set the
context for examining price elasticity as a predictor of success for tuition resets.
Price as Signal of Quality or Sacrifice
In competitively mature or declining markets, price strategy works to both create
and harvest value (Simon, 2015). Valerie Zeithaml (1988) argues that consumers perceive
value by comparing perceptions of benefit (what will they receive in both monetary and
non-monetary terms) to perceptions of cost (what will they have to give up in both
monetary and non-monetary terms). When perceptions of benefit are high and
perceptions of cost are low, consumers perceive high value and are more willing to
purchase. The role of price in shaping these perceptions is a function of both industry and
consumer characteristics.
As a service industry, traditional colleges and universities need to overcome the
challenges of intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability (Lovelock &
Gummesson, 2004; Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016) to increase perceptions of value. The
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education process itself is intangible in that it is an exercise of mental stimulation. It is
heterogeneous in that each student will learn and gain differently, even if given the same
experience. Traditional classroom experiences are inseparable, meaning the experience of
teaching and learning cannot be separated from the process of learning. Finally,
traditional education is perishable in that it cannot be stored (Wirtz & Lovelock, 2016).
Customer characteristics are also a critical consideration for understanding how
prices are understood, specifically knowledge of price, purchase characteristics,
perceived fairness and value components (Rao, 2010). When customers lack price
knowledge, they become more dependent upon outside cues to estimate what others are
paying, and what they should expect to pay for a service. Characteristics of the purchase
may also enhance or reduce price sensitivity. Students who want to enroll at a prestigious
university might be willing to pay a premium for advance consideration. Perceived
fairness can become a concern if segments of students come to believe others are
receiving a better deal. Establishing clear price fences and transparency in pricing can
help address concerns about fairness (Nagle et al., 2011). Finally, it is critical for colleges
and universities to deeply understand the variety of value components their offerings
represent to prospective students. Value components can be functional (e.g. a credential),
financial (e.g. lowest price), social (e.g. the prestige of having earned a degree at a wellregarded institution) and psychological (the self-rewarding value of learning in itself).
Prospective students are highly dependent upon quality signals or cues to
establish perceptions of benefit (Rao, 2010) given the nature of higher education as a
credence good. Customers cannot fully access or understand the offering until they
consume it. Therefore, they become reliant upon other “clues” or “signals” to infer the
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quality of the offering (Nagle et al., 2011). While the education itself is intangible, its
quality is inferred in part by physical manifestations such as the condition of the physical
campus facilities, feelings the customer gets by interacting with recruitment staff,
reputation and rankings from third-party services, and most importantly for the discussion
at hand: price (Luca & Smith, 2013).
Insofar as the price can be used by uninitiated buyers as a signal to quality, a
higher sticker price can create perceptions of value. A high price itself can create a
perception of quality and willingness to pay, a notion called Chivas Regal effect which
has been dominant in higher education pricing models (Askin & Bothner, 2016; Quigley
et al., 2000). Thorstein Veblen observed that in luxury good markets high prices created
barriers which in turn created a positive sense of exclusivity (Breaking Down Finance,
2019). In higher education marketing, high prices work to stimulate demand by
communicating a sense of prestige and quality (Turner, 2011).
Research in consumer goods provides a theoretical basis for understanding the
relationship of price to perceptions of quality. Shirai (2014) found high-quality low-price
appeals created negative perceptions when offered in the context of other high-priced
offerings. However, when offered in a context with other low-price offerings, it generated
positive impressions. This suggests that colleges with favorable rankings compared to
higher price peers might be well served to sustain high sticker prices to preserve
favorable perceptions.
However, the price also represents a cost to consumers, a sense that sacrifice is
required to access the benefits of an offering (Chang et al., 2015; Zeithaml, 1988). From
the perspective of the supplier, the goal of value signaling is to decrease sensitivity (move
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towards price inelastic behavior). Recent research on college pricing suggests the ways
high sticker prices are interpreted may change over time; a higher sticker price may
signal higher quality sometimes, but also may signal higher cost and thereby discourage
enrollment (Fincher & Katsinas, 2017). More and more prospective students rule out a
college choice based on sticker price alone. According to SallieMae & Ipsos Public
Affairs, in 2015, 50% of students eliminated a college choice based on cost alone prior to
applying. By 2018 the figure grew to 70% (SallieMae & Ipsos Public Affairs, 2015,
2018). Beyond enrollment of new students, tuition increases not matched by increases in
financial aid for current students may result in student attrition, and thus revenue loss
(Bryan & Whipple, 1995).
Previous studies of price elasticity in the higher education market have found that
market enrollment demand overall is relatively inelastic with regards to the sticker price
tuition increases (Gallet, 2017; Tellis, 1988). However, price response behavior varies
based on individual student characteristics (e.g. level of student, demographic factors)
(Carter & Curry, 2011) and by types of education delivery. Upperclassmen have lower
elasticity coefficients than underclassmen as they risk losing credit should they decide to
transfer (Bryan & Whipple, 1995). A study of Morehouse College, a historically black
college for men, found that demand for course-hour enrollment was price inelastic but
income elastic which favors a high tuition and high discount model (Price & Sheftall,
2015).
Another study, Bradley et al (2010) looks at the difference between sticker price and
net price elasticities in the higher education context. The researchers found students were
relatively inelastic with regards to sticker price, but more elastic with regards to net price.

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

10

However, behavior varied between different levels of financial need. High price and high
discount scenarios encouraged enrollments of lower-income students, and low discount
models which raised net price discouraged their enrollment. Such behavior is consistent
with findings in student choice modeling performed by market research firms, such as
Ruffalo Noel Levitz, that perform price sensitivity studies. Frequently, the negative
influence of increasing tuition and fees on willingness to enroll is less than the positive
influence of increasing financial aid by the same amount—which ultimately brings the
prospective student to a final consideration of net price (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017).
Tuition resets provide a natural experiment for researchers of higher education to
compare the relationship of sticker price elasticity with net price elasticity. In a tuition
reset, the sticker price (which often signals quality and is expected to increase) is usually
reduced by a significant amount, but the net price (which signals cost and would also be
expected to be reduced if sticker price is reduced) typically remains unchanged. In some
cases, the net price may actually increase as the sticker price decreases (Krupnick, 2016).
Such changes in price can create a dissonance in the minds of potential students regarding
what the “right” price should be.
The interpretation of future prices cannot be independent of current prices since the
current price serves as a reference point to understand future changes (Dolan & Simon,
1996; Meehan et al., 2011). When changing prices, it is to the institution’s advantage to
supply a rationale for the change rather than leave things to the customer’s interpretation.
A price increase might be more acceptable if it is explained by a commensurate and
demonstrable increase in quality. In general, customers are willing to pay if what is
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offered fits their preferences (Davey et al., 2006). A price decrease, which breaks an
expected pattern of increases, risks signaling reduced value for an offering.
To mitigate such perceptions, firms could message some type of “greater price
transparency” or “cost-savings passed along” appeal. (Dolan & Simon, 1996; Nagle et al.,
2011). In industries that are price inelastic especially, a price reduction could be
interpreted as a response to increased competition and lead to further erosion of perceived
value for the firm’s offerings (Foubert et al., 2018; Meehan et al., 2011). Further, price
cuts can lead to reactive price cuts by competitors (Dolan & Simon, 1996) and run the
risk of triggering expensive price wars, which may result in erosion of overall market
value (Smith, 2017).
Bodfish (personal communication, May 23, 2017), Casamento (2016), Lapovsky
(2015, 2019) and Lawlor (2016) emphasize the need for the execution of extensive
marketing campaigns to accompany tuition resets to help multiple audiences interpret the
tuition reset from a value perspective, including websites, email campaigns, press
releases, and town-hall-style meetings for Q&A. Common messaging included emphasis
on cost reduction to some students, pricing transparency, and consistency in quality.
Higher Education Moving to Greater Price Competition
The goals of an institutional price strategy reflect industry conditions and
characteristics. In mature or declining industries, the competitor set and competing
products are defined more clearly. Price-based competition is intensified as consumers
lose a sense that products are differentiated, and capacity exceeds demand. The problem
of over-capacity is especially acute if exit barriers are significant (Meehan et al., 2011;
Nagle et al., 2011; Porter, 1998b). Toxic markets emerge where price competition
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becomes so severe that firms compete at prices lower than the costs of production (Porter,
1998a).
Traditional higher education markets reflect many industry characteristics of
mature and declining markets. According to the National Clearinghouse Research Center,
overall college enrollments have declined for the sixth consecutive year, and are expected
to continue to decline in the foreseeable future (Fain, 2017). The 4-year private not-forprofit sector—the sector where many tuition resets are occurring—has experienced
negative growth in five of the most recent seven years (National Student Clearinghouse
Research Center, 2017). In December 2017, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded the
higher education sector from “stable” to “negative” (Harris, 2017). The negative ratings
continued throughout 2019 due to constrained tuition revenue (Osborn & Fitzgerald,
2019). Due to delays in having children during the Great Recession starting in 2008, the
number of college-bound high school graduates could decline by a staggering 15% by the
mid-2020s according to WICHE data (Jaschik, 2018; Western Interstate Commission for
Higher Education, 2016) further exacerbating current enrollment declines, especially in
the northeast.
As enrollment declines continue, the market is undergoing structural changes to
reduce over-capacity. Many higher education theorists such as Clayton M. Christensen
predict mass closures and mergers among small, non-elite, and private colleges with the
rise of online learning and other new innovative educational models (Christensen &
Eyring, 2011; Poole, 2017). Such predictions seem to be coming to fruition as mergers
and closures are becoming increasingly frequent (Fernandez, 2017; Woodhouse, 2015).
Websites are emerging among industry news firms to track the number and reasons for
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college closures and mergers (Bauman & O’Leary, 2019; Education Dive Staff, 2019;
Jaschik, 2019).
However, significant exit barriers exist within higher education slowing the
correction of over-capacity. Per accreditation standards, colleges must form plans for
current students. Mergers and college closures are becoming more frequent—roughly five
annually on average (Woodhouse, 2015). The mergers and closures are expected to
increase in frequency. Members of the college community may resist the closure process.
In an interesting case, Sweet Briar College, a prestigious women’s college, sought to
close in 2015 due to increasing discount rates and diminishing enrollments. However,
loyal alumni fought to restart the college. As of 2017, enrollments are in decline
again(Seltzer, 2017b). Similarly, Montreat College was on the verge of closure but
received major philanthropic support (Ball, 2016) and has been attempting to rebuild over
the last three years.
In mature markets, competitive forces act to reduce the differentiation between
purchase options (Smith, 2017). In other words, there is pressure to “commoditize”
offerings. In higher education, commoditization assumes at least two significant forms.
First, there is an explosion of rating and ranking systems that facilitate easy comparison
between presumably similar options, thereby creating a sense of interchangeability
between options. The U.S. News & World Report, one of the most well-known among
many rankings, ranks colleges within categories based on their Carnegie Classification.
The criteria used include reputation, the academic profile of incoming students, retention
and graduation rates, and financial strength (Morse et al., 2016). New rankings have also
emerged within the last ten years which emphasize the financial pay-out of college
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including Payscale.com (Payscale, 2017), Money Magazine (Clark, 2016), and Forbes
(Coudriet, 2018). The Department of Education developed a college ranking system
under the Obama administration. However, after protracted discussion with higher
education leaders, the Department of Education settled on a College Scorecard system,
wherein key statistics about cost, retention, and employment outcomes are listed (DoE
Press Office, 2016).
Students are increasingly unbundling their education experience; it can no longer
be assumed that the pursuit of a degree will be a singular four-year course of study at a
single institution (Selingo, 2013). Increasingly, students earn credits from multiple
institutions to complete their degree, a process referred to as student swirl (Selingo,
2013). Underlying the approach is the assumption that courses between institutions are
interchangeable and credits can be transferred to the institution of record without a
substantive degradation in the quality of overall education received (Borden, 2004;
Christensen & Eyring, 2011).
Another factor contributing to the decline in enrollment in traditional colleges is
increasing receptivity to alternative forms of online instruction and nontraditional
credentialing for skills development among employers (Farrington, 2014; Selingo, 2013).
New forms of life-preparation such as online degree completion allow for more selfpaced learning. Apprenticeships allow students to learn hands-on trades (U.S. Department
of Labor, 2018; Varetto, 2017) and earn credit for life-learning in a system known as
competency-based assessment (Gruppen et al., 2016). In many technical fields, online
“badges” can be accrued which certify mastery of some specific skills or areas
(Muilenburg & Berge, 2016). Each of these alternatives diverts the number of students
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that otherwise would have considered the 4-year traditional colleges and offers their own
unique competing value propositions (Kirst & Stevens, 2015; Selingo, 2013).
Higher education has also long been an industry with significant information
asymmetry. The suppliers (e.g. colleges and universities) collect information about the
potential consumers and determine the price to be paid (via determination of financial aid
offers contingent upon family income, student academic profile, student fit for other
desired attributes). Such information asymmetry has traditionally allowed colleges and
universities to utilize revenue management practices which price discriminate based on
desired enrollment goals and applicant profiles (Rebbapragada et al., 2010). However, the
increase of consumer information revealing net price paid, debt levels of graduates, and
graduation rates dramatically reduces the information asymmetry.
Given the compounding effect of these deteriorating market conditions—reduced
differentiation, an increasing number of alternatives, decreased information asymmetry
and excess capacity—the influence of buyers’ bargaining power is increased. Under these
conditions, price strategy becomes a more critical and competitive factor as it becomes
the basis for the buyer’s final decision. The most visible evidence of increasing buyerpower is the increase of discounts—in the form of institutional scholarship and grant
aid—that colleges and universities offer to students to entice enrollment. According to the
2018 Tuition Discounting Study performed annually by NACUBO, the First-Time, FullTime Freshman discount rate reached an all-time high of 52.2% in Fall 2018. This is up
12.3 percentage points from 39.9% from ten years ago, with more than 1.2 percentage
points increase per year (NACUBO, 2019; Valbrun, 2019). In other words, while the
sticker price of colleges and universities has continued to increase significantly, the
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revenue received by the college on a per-student basis has only increased marginally
(Newton, 2019). Many researchers perceive the increase in discounting as an
unsustainable phenomenon (Behaunek, 2015; Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016) which can lead to
market toxicity wherein offerings are sold at prices lower than the cost to provide (Porter,
1998b).
The Tuition Reset Strategy
Pricing in higher education raises a series of complex financial and marketing
concerns. The sticker price is the published price for tuition, fees, room, and board.
Colleges award scholarship and grant aid to discount the sticker price, resulting in a
lower net price. Discount rate is the percentage of tuition and fees given back in the form
of institutional discounts (NACUBO, 2019; Ruffalo Noel Levitz, 2017). During the first
year of attendance, the amount of institutional scholarship and grant aid awarded is set
for each student. In later years, tuition and fees increase, but the institutional scholarship
and grant awards usually do not change except in cases of demonstrable changes in
family income. Therefore, the discount rates are usually higher for first-year students than
returning students who pay more from annual rate increases (Ehrenberg, 2000).
Against the general trend of rising sticker prices to attend college, tuition resets
(also known as tuition reductions or tuition rollbacks) lower the published sticker price of
tuition and fees, but also make reductions to institutional grants and scholarships to
accomplish approximately the same net price (Bernard, 2019; Lapovsky, 2015). Such a
change has several important financial implications:


Only students who are full-paying—or close to full-paying—will realize savings
by the amount of the tuition reduction (or the difference between the amount of
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the tuition reduction and the aid they received) (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017; L. Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1,
2016). The resulting loss of revenue can be expensive to the institution when the
number of current students who have low discount rates is considered (Lapovsky,
2015).


To break-even financially, tuition resets need to enroll large enough quantities of
new students to cover the loss of revenue from both new and continuing students
who would have been full—or nearly full—paying (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015). If an
institution has many near-full-pay or full-pay students, a tuition reset is unlikely
to break even.



Students receiving institutional grants at the same amount (or greater) than the
tuition reset amount will pay approximately the same net price (S. Bodfish,
personal communication, May 23, 2017; Lapovsky, 2015).



Because the aid current students receive will be reduced commensurate to the
tuition reduction amount, funded aid dollars can be freed to meet a higher
percentage of need and for more students (S. Bodfish, personal communication,
May 23, 2017). Net tuition revenues from these students will remain about the
same.



The institution’s ability to meet need from funded institutional grant aid sources is
increased because the calculated need for students is reduced by the tuition
reduction amount, aiding long term financial stability (Browning, 2013; Martin,
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2004). Because funded grant aid goes further, institutions reduce reliance on
unfunded grant aid.


Institutions reduce their NACUBO Discount Rate which is viewed as positive
from the perspective of potential creditors.
Tuition resets also represent a significant marketing opportunity to reposition the

institution among its peers (Lawlor, 2016). Because 70% of students report eliminating
colleges as an option on the basis of cost alone prior to applying (SallieMae & Ipsos
Public Affairs, 2018), institutions that implement tuition resets hope to significantly
expand the number of prospective students who would consider applying to their
institution. Frequently, a significant promotional campaign effort is launched to create
awareness of the price change, explain how it will benefit students, and seek to reposition
the institution among its constellation of competitors (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017; L. Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1, 2016;
Lawlor, 2016).
In summary, to be successful from a financial perspective, a tuition reset should
attract enough students so that the cost of the reset—in terms of promotional costs and
lost incremental revenues from full-paying and low-discount-rate returning students—is
covered by a higher volume of new students enrolled. To be successful from a marketing
perspective, institutions need to make students believe the quality of education they will
be receiving is the same as or better than that prior to the reset, and the price they will be
paying is “fair” (Bodfish, 2017).
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Research Questions
Tuition resets offer a natural experiment to assess the impact of sticker price
elasticity on several facets of enrollment behavior. This study will address the following
research questions:
1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in first-year student enrollment
for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net tuition and fee revenue
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student enrollment for institutions
implementing a tuition reset?
4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year
students for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in the proportion of first-year Pell-eligible student
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment for institutions
implementing a tuition reset?
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As discussed in the literature review, many practitioners emphasize the role of
advertising in successfully implementing a tuition reset. For each of the above research
questions, this study also examines the intervening effects of a change in advertising
spending.
Additional considerations will also be explored such as whether the size of a
tuition reduction influences results, influence on transfer student enrollment, and the
influence of a reset on retention. We will also consider if resets following the 2010 Great
Recession were more successful than those preceding it.
Significance of the Study
This research makes several important contributions to the literature:
Tuition resets are happening more often. Between 1995 and 2005, 22 institutions
announced a tuition reset. Between 2005-2015, 66 institutions announced tuition resets (a
300% increase). In only the three years between 2015 and 2018, 36 institutions
announced tuition resets. While the effectiveness of tuition resets is still a matter for
discussion and research, clearly a growing number of institutions are willing to consider
the reset strategy.
There are few academic studies on the tuition reset strategy, despite increasing
attention in news and media. Academic and privately funded studies focused on
qualitative methods such as multiple case studies. Important multiple case studies
include:


Lucie Lapovsky’s (2015) multiple-case study Tuition Reset: An Analysis of Eight
Colleges that Addressed the Escalating Price of Higher Education continues to be
cited in news articles frequently and was funded by the Lumina Foundation.
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Laura Casamento’s (2016) dissertation, A Multiple Case Study Analysis Exploring
How Less Selective, Tuition-Dependent Colleges and Universities Approached an
Undergraduate Tuition Price Reset Strategy provides further case study analysis.



Eldridge and Cawley (2017) described the experience of planning for a tuition
reset and how Rosemont College interpreted the results in Beyond the headlines:
the mechanics of a tuition reset.

More recently a few researchers are also studying resets using quantitative methods:


Alex Bloom (2017) of Education Advisory Board reported the results of a study
of 27 institutions in a blog post entitled Appealing but ineffective: Why tuition
resets aren't consistently successful and found that tuition resets were not
consistently successful.



Sarah Kottich’s dissertation Tuition Reductions: A Quantitative Analysis of the
Prevalence, Circumstances and Outcomes of an Emerging Pricing Strategy in
Higher Education assessed a range of effects of tuition resets implemented by 45
institutions (2017).



Lucie Lapovski, Kottich’s dissertation advisor, then released a quantitative study
(2019) of tuition reset results.
To the best of this author’s knowledge, this study of 72 institutions regarding the

impact and financial implications of tuition resets is the largest and most comprehensive
quantitative analysis to date.
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This study provides a new quantitative lens for understanding tuition resets. The
preliminary results section supplies a valuable characterization of results that institutions
implementing tuition resets have realized through descriptive statistics. Further,
combining elements of the event-study methodology from finance with the variety of
variables from IPEDS, the impact of tuition resets on a host of institutional factors can be
explored in subsequent studies such as change in academic profile of students that apply,
changes in ethnic composition of first-year students, 4-year graduation rates (as an
indicator of college completion), changes in indicators of institutional financial health,
and many others.
This study extends literature about the effects of price as a quality signal in
service industries. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment by which researchers can
contrast the influence of sticker price and net price on a purchase decision. Because
tuition resets change the sticker price and while net price remains substantially the same,
the signaling impact of sticker price changes can be statistically tested using a series of
important outcome variables such as application generation, admitted students, enrolled
students, and revenue from first-year students.
This study also makes important contributions to practice. Industry practitioners
are asking many important questions about the outcomes and implications of a tuition
reset. This study supplies baseline information that addresses the scale and breadth of
outcomes experienced by institutions implementing tuition resets.
Especially important from the practitioner perspective, the study also addresses
prediction questions. Building on the general question of what happens when institutions
reset their tuition, recruitment managers need to assess the suitability and effectiveness of
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the tuition resetting strategy for their specific institution. Predictive models created in this
study can help practitioners understand potential outcomes and the drivers of different
potential outcomes for specific institutions, within the constraints of the model accuracy
and predictive power.
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Chapter 3 - Methodology
As discussed in earlier chapters, in service industries such as higher education,
price can play two roles; both as an indicator of quality and as an indicator of cost. But as
industries mature or transition to decline, consumers may respond to price messages in
different ways. In the higher education market, researchers can model sticker price
elasticities and net price elasticities separately. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment
through which the influence of sticker price alone on facets of enrollment behavior can be
better understood.
This chapter describes the methods used to test the research problems identified in
the previous chapters. First, a rationale for borrowing from the event-study methodology
will be provided, and a detailed description of how it can be adapted to the process of a
tuition reset implementation. Second, the process of selecting participants and gathering
data is described. Third, the variables for observation are described. Fourth, detailed
procedures are described for gathering, cleaning, and analyzing the data will be
described. Finally, the methods of data analysis are detailed.
Research Design and Rationale
This study borrows elements from the event study methodology but is not a true
event study in that there is no comparison with institutions that have not reset. A tuition
reset usually is a specific one-time event, unlike tuition discounting which involves an
ongoing annual process of defining discounting goals. Typically—although there are
exceptions—an institution operates at a “high price/high discount,” performs the reset,
and in subsequent years resumes the annual cycle of setting prices with discounts. As
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discrete one-time occurrences in the life-span of an institution, the event-study
methodology offers a favorable analytical lens from which to understand both the
phenomenon of tuition-resets (Boehmer, 1991), but also to highlight the role sticker price
elasticity plays in impacting varied dependent variables such as first-year enrollment, net
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, and changes in the percentage of Pelleligible first-year students.
Born from the discipline of finance to analyze the impact of stock splits, event
studies involve the comparison of statistically modeled firm performance prior to a
specific event—such as the announcement of a tuition reset—with the performance
following (MacKinlay, 1997). The event study methodology has been extended to other
fields, including marketing, to better understand the financial impact of different potential
actions on firms (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Skiera et al., 2017; Sorescu et al., 2017).
To apply elements of the event-study methodology to the phenomenon of tuition
resets, a conceptual timeline was developed (See Table 1 below) to emulate how the
process of a tuition reset unfolds (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017):
Table 1
Conceptual model for tuition reset timeline and variable calculation
Relative Year
Definition
Management Events
-3
Three years prior to the reset
No change.
-2
Two years prior to the reset
No Change
-1
One year prior to the reset
FY Enrolled reflect old student charge
structure, however, tuition reset is
formally announced.
0
First-year at new lower sticker
Recruitment results reflect the
price in effect
understanding of the new reset price
structure.
Note: Most colleges run on a July to June fiscal year system. Therefore, relative years split
calendar years.
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While tuition resets occurred during different years for different institutions, a
uniform model that standardizes events and measures to a relative timeline is needed.
Price elasticities are assessed based on price and first-year student enrollments between
years -3 and -1. This approximates the timing needed to complete decisions about
whether to proceed with a tuition reset. Recruitment results of the reset are assessed in
Year 0 where the first cohort of first-year students aware of the new reset price structure
enrolls.
Data analysis will employ binary logistic and linear regression methods, both of
which are quantitative (Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013; Salkind, 2017).
Implementing a tuition reset strategy involves an assessment of risk to practitioners.
Research questions 1 and 2 (R1 and R2) pertain to how independent variables influence
the likelihood of a specified outcome (more students or more net revenue from first-year
students). Binary logistic regression is used to identify the influence of independent
variables on the log-likelihood of a Boolean event (the dependent variable) occurring
(Chapman & Feit, 2015). The results of logistic regression can be used to give
probabilities of a successful outcome on an institutional basis.
Research questions 3, 4, 5, and 6 (R3, R4, R5, and R6) pertain to the influence of
independent variables on levels of an independent variable. Linear regression is used to
quantify the influence of one or more independent variables on levels of an independent
variable (Berenson et al., 1992; Salkind, 2017). Where this discussion focuses on the
influence of sticker price elasticity, other variables—as discussed in the literature and as
mentioned by industry experts—are included in models to increase their statistical power.

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

27

Participants and Sampling
As of 2016, there were 1,594 4-year private not-for-profit colleges as recognized
by the National Center for Education Statistics (2018), a relatively well-defined industry
sector. Tuition resets are a contrarian phenomenon which depends, in part, on highly
publicized announcements of price reductions to attract attention (Lapovsky, 2015;
Lawlor, 2016).
To develop the analysis dataset, multiple methods of ‘discovering’ tuition reset
institutions were used. I interviewed Scott Bodfish, Vice President of Market Research at
Ruffalo Noel Levitz (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017) who provided
a list of institutions he was familiar with that had implemented tuition resets. I conducted
internet searches to reveal lists of institutions that implemented tuition resets or identify
institutions themselves. The major lists found included Affordable Schools.net
(Affordable Schools, 2017), Cappex (Kantrowitz, 2017), Edvisors (Edvisors, 2017),
Education Dive (Shumski, 2014), NAICU (National Association of Independent Colleges
and Universities, 2017) and more recently Savingforcollege.com (Kantrowitz, 2019). I
reached out to Alex Bloom of EAB (2017) via telephone discussion to compare the list I
had compiled at that point to his. I set up Google Alerts to provide notifications when
items were published to the web with the phrases “tuition reset” or “tuition cut.” To
further increase the validity of the institution list, news articles and institutional website
announcements were collected to document tuition resets that were the result of specific
intentional marketing efforts, and not attributed to other causes (e.g. institutional mergers,
negotiations with state legislatures). Finally, I reviewed and compared institutions on my
list to those listed in the appendix of Sarah Kottich’s dissertation (2017).
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To the researcher’s knowledge, the resulting list of 142 institutions which
announced tuition resets is the most comprehensive list yet compiled, and the sample size
represents an overwhelming majority of the total population of institutions that have
implemented tuition resets for the period under observation (July 1997 to July 2018). At
present, there are 72 private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions for which enough
information is available to perform data analysis. Of this 72, 43 have advertising and
promotion expenditure information.
After compiling the list of institutions, the tuition resets were verified by
identifying web pages with public news announcements of the tuition reset, tuition reset
announcement microsites hosted within institutional websites. Further, IPEDS data was
pulled for student charges to ensure the tuition and fee reductions reported were realized
in regulatory reporting. Sarah Kottich (2017) identified a list of institutions that initially
appeared to have conducted tuition resets, but disqualified them due to extenuating
circumstances. These institutions are also excluded.
Measures
This research will focus on the impact of sticker price elasticity on several facets
of enrollment behavior. A broad set of data points was developed to strengthen the
explanatory power of models developed in support of the research questions. Because
this study uses publicly available data sources (IPEDS, IRS, U.S. Census Bureau),
industry-standard definitions are assumed. Refer to Appendix B for a comprehensive list
of variable definitions used in this study, data sources, and official definitions according
to the sources.
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Drawing from this broader set of measures, it is appropriate to highlight a few of
the more important measures directly referenced in the research questions:


Sticker price elasticity (or PED_Sticker) measures price elasticity using changes
in first-year students enrolling as a measure of demand quantity and sticker price
as the measure of price change.



Transfer sticker price elasticity (or PED_Sticker_XFR) measures price elasticity
using changes in transfer students enrolling as a measure of demand quantity and
sticker price as the measure of price change.



First-year student enrollment change percent (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) is the percent
change in the number of first-time students enrolled between the year prior to and
during the first year of the reset. First-time students enrolled (Enrolled_Y0) refers
to the number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
applied, were admitted and enrolled (full- or part-time) at an institution for the
most recent fall period available. These include early decision, early action, and
students who began studies during the summer prior to that fall during the year of
a tuition reset (NCES National Center for Education Statistics, 2017).



Reset success by enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment) is a categorical
variable that indicates if the tuition reset resulted in a five percent or greater
increase in first-time student enrollment relative to the year prior. If there was a
five percent or greater increase this measure would be true, otherwise, it is false.
A five percent increase in one year marks a material increase in first-year student
enrollment.
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Net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students (FY_Net_Revenue_Y0) is the
average net price times the number of first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_Y0)



Net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students’ percent change
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) is the percent change between Y-1 and Y0 in
net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students.



Reset success by first-year net revenue (Reset_Success_NetRevenue) is a
categorical variable that indicates if the tuition reset resulted in five percent or
more dollars of net revenue from first-year students relative to the year prior. If
there was five percent net revenue or more, this measure would be true, otherwise
is false. A five percent increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year
students in one year marks a material increase.



Difference in percent Pell (PercentPell_CHG) is the percentage difference in Pelleligible students between the year prior to the reset (PercentPell_YearPrior) and
during the first-year at the new lower price (PercentPell_Y0).



Retention change (Retention_CHG) is the difference in first-year student retention
rates between Y-1 and Y0.
It is also appropriate to include financial ratios—used to assess aspects of the

financial health of colleges and universities—as independent variables prior to the reset
given their prominence in many discussions found in the literature. Many practitioners
emphasize the need for colleges to be financially vital prior to undertaking a tuition reset
(S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2019;
Lawlor, 2016). KPMG’s Composite Financial Index (CFI) is a summary measure of an
institution’s financial health based on four ratios (Pelletier, 2015). These ratios have also
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been adapted by the Austen Group’s Financial Indicators Tool (FIT) and are widely
known by higher education finance professionals:


Primary reserve ratio—also known as the operating reserve ratio in FIT—
(Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior) explores whether an institution’s resources
are enough and flexible or liquid enough to support its mission.



Net operating revenues ratio—also known as the operating margin ratio in FIT—
(Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior) looks at whether operating results show that
the institution is living within its available resources.



Return on net position ratio—also known as the change in net assets ratio in
FIT— (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) examines how well the
institution’s asset performance and management support its strategic direction.



Viability Ratio (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior) assesses how strategically the
institution’s financial resources, including debt, are managed to advance the
institution’s mission.



While not a part of CFI, the equity ratio (EquityRatio_Y0) is an important
measure of financial leverage in the year prior to implanting a tuition reset.
Many practitioners who have written about tuition reset emphasize the need to

implement a marketing campaign in conjunction with a tuition reset (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015; Lawlor, 2016). A
survey of all reset institutions to provide estimates of promotional expenditures specific
to the tuition reset was considered but ultimately rejected due to the likelihood of a low
response rate (Dillman et al., 2014) which would net insufficient information to make
statistically significant observations. Institutional “Advertising and Promotion”
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expenditures from Form 990 data during the years prior to and during a tuition reset event
was available for a sub-set (N=43) of the institutions implementing a tuition reset. From
this data, two measures of advertising were developed:


Advertising and promotion spend year prior
(AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YearPrior) is the dollars spent in advertising and
promotion expenditures during the year the tuition reset is announced, presumably
to promote the reset in part.



Change in advertising and promotion spend by percentage
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) is the percentage difference in advertising
expenditures between Year -1 and Year -2. As a percentage, this measure
normalizes institutions of different sizes.

Data Collection Procedure
Approval from George Fox University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) was
unnecessary due to the use of anonymous panel data. No individual-level data were used
for analysis. The data set used for analysis combined institution-level information from
IPEDS, Form 990s, and U.S. Census Data. Appendix B provides a comprehensive list of
variable definitions used in the analysis, identifies the primary source of data for each
variable and official definitions according to the source.
IPEDS
Colleges and universities participating in the Title IV financial aid program are
required to provide accurate annual statistical reports to the Department of Education
through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (or IPEDS) (National
Center for Educational Statistics, 2017). As a public service, IPEDS data is accessible

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

33

through the IPEDS Data Center to researchers for download. As pertaining to this study,
the IPEDS Data Center allows downloading of needed data including institutional
characteristics, institutional address/location, tuition and fees charged, applications, the
number of first-year students who enrolled, the number of first-year students who
received institutional grant aid, and the average amount of institutional grant aid firstyear students received. From these data points, other important ratios can be calculated.
While this research has identified a list of institutions that have implemented
tuition resets between 1995 and 2018, the availability of data from IPEDS varies by
survey component. The IPEDS data review process also precludes publicly publishing
institutional information for up to two years thus creating lags in the availability of
information. IPEDS data used in this analysis was harvested through a multi-step process:
1. A comparison group file was created which contained the OPEID and name of
every institution on the list of reset institutions (See Appendix A). The OPE ID
number uniquely identifies each institution in IPEDS to the Office of
Postsecondary Education (CEDS, 2019; NCES National Center for Education
Statistics, 2017).
2. A variable set file was created which captured all variables used in the analysis
from the IPEDS data center. Variables were selected from the following catalogs
(or sub-surveys of IPEDS) for as many years as were available:
o Institutional Characteristics
o Admissions and Test Scores
o Student Charges
o Retention rates, Entering Class, and Student to Faculty Ratio
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o Student Financial Aid and Net Price
o Finance
3. The institutional data was downloaded based on the Institution list and selected
variables cited in the Variables list using the IPEDS Compare Institutions tool
(National Center for Educational Statistics, 2019). The downloaded file was a .csv
which could be opened and manipulated in Excel.
4. The downloaded IPEDS data was then staged for review. Using the provided data
dictionary, all numerically coded variables were transformed into their text values
(e.g. institution types). The columns were sorted so all variables were grouped
together and placed in a series format by year. All calculated variables based on
IPEDS data fields were added without error checking so error messages due to
incomplete data could be clearly identified.
5. A copy of the raw data was scaffolded to prepare for implementing the eventstudy model (described above). A column was added which listed the year of reset
as it applied to each institution name. A row was added to standardize the fiscal
year each variable represented (Years in IPEDS Sometimes reference the start of a
fiscal year, and for other variables reference the end of a fiscal year, and
sometimes reference both). Institution records were then sorted by institution
type, and by reset year.
6. With scaffolding in place, data were checked for completeness and data types:
o Institutions that were publicized to have implemented resets but did not
report lower tuition and fees charged to IPEDS were removed from the
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data set. This happened when program-specific resets rather than
institution-level resets occurred.
o Because the scope of this research is private not-for-profit institutions, all
other colleges were filtered out of the data set.
o If institutions were missing counts for the variable “Enrolled” but had a
first-year full-time financial aid cohort, the value of first-year full-time
financial aid cohort was provided to the variable “Enrolled.”
o Each row was checked for missing data, and then that data values were of
the expected data types, and that data were within expected ranges.
7. A time-series calculation was inserted above each Year of Reset grouping of
institutions and for each variable set. Year 0 was the first year of the new sticker
price. Year -3 was three years prior to the new price. Year 3 was the third year
following the change (or 4th year at the new price). After these time-series
calculations were inserted, all rows for all variables were realigned horizontally
from an actual year system to the new relative-year/time-scaled system.
Form 990
The Form 990 is roughly analogous to a tax return filed with the IRS to disclose
sources and uses of funds by a not-for-profit organization (Blazek & Adams, 2009). Most
public and private colleges and universities are tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue
Code 501(c)(3) and are therefore required to complete an IRS Form 990 on an annual
basis (Association of American Universities, 2014; Internal Revenue Service, 2018).
Financial data for each private not-for-profit institution was drawn from both
IPEDS and Form 990 information to support the analysis of financial health using the
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Composite Financial Index (CFI) methodology. The Financial Indicators Tool (FIT) as
provided by The Austen Group provided detailed calculation instructions to calculate
these ratios and the CFI based on data from IPEDS and Form 990 data (Chabotar, 2006;
The Austen Group, 2019a).
Form 990 information data was acquired through a free academic GuideStar
Premium subscription to GuideStar by Candid (GuideStar, 2019). Access to this
subscription required written verification of the goal of this study and approval of the
George Fox University librarian.
The following steps were performed to create a financial data analysis file:
1. A copy of the IPEDS analysis dataset was made following Step 7 above.
2. All variables were removed, except for all years available of the following:
o Institution Identifier
o Institution Name
o Year of Reset
o Endowment assets (year-end) per FTE enrollment (FASB)
o Equity ratio (FASB)
o Net assets beginning of the year
o Net assets end of the year
o Total change in net assets
o Total expenses
o Total net assets
o Debt related to Property Plant and Equipment
o Total unrestricted net assets - EOY
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o Temporarily restricted net assets
o Permanently restricted net assets included in total restricted net assets
o Property Plant and Equipment net of accumulated depreciation
o Total Revenue
3. A time-series calculation was inserted above each Year of Reset grouping of
institutions and for each variable set. Year 0 was the first year of the new sticker
price. Year -3 was three years prior to the new price. Year 3 was the third year
following the price change (or 4th year at the new price).
4. For each institution, for each year, Form 990 data in GuideStar (which is reported
to the IRS by an institution’s finance office and has to match an audited Financial
Statement) was compared to IPEDS finance data (which is reported through
finance or Institutional Research). To maintain an audit trail of changes, all places
where Form 990 data over-rode IPEDS data the font color was changed to
burgundy in the worksheet.
o Institution names and Employer Identification Numbers (EIN’s) were used
to ensure a match between specific institutions found in IPEDS and Form
990 searches.
o If there were missing data elements in IPEDS data, the Form 990 data was
supplied.
o If there were conflicts between IPEDS and Form 990 data, the Form 990
data would take precedence over the IPEDS data. Form 990 data is
provided to the IRS and is subject to audit, and therefore under a higher
level of scrutiny (Blazek & Adams, 2009, p. 990).
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o If the ending balance of an earlier year conflicted with the starting balance
of the following year, the following year’s starting balances would take
precedence over the ending balance of the earlier year on the assumption
that errors were discovered and corrected.
5. The “Advertising and Promotion” data elements were added to the analysis sheet
for three years prior and up to the year of each institution’s tuition reset.
6. Some data elements (See Appendix B for detailed information) were calculated
and added including the four KPMG ratios and CFI (both with and without debt
as according to FIT) as demonstrated in the Appendix of the sample FIT report
(The Austen Group, 2019b).
7. Columns were re-aligned horizontally from an actual year system to the relativeyear/time-scaled system. Columns prior to Year -3 and following Year 3 were
removed.
8. The finance variables data set was merged with the IPEDS data set by Institution
ID.
U.S. Census Population and Geographic data
Tuition resets represent a strategic opportunity to capture the attention of
individuals who might not otherwise consider an institution, and more individuals are
better. With this in mind, industry practitioners have posited institutions with access to
dense regional populations are better positioned for success (S. Bodfish, personal
communication, May 23, 2017) since most students attend colleges within a one-day
drive of their home (Wexlar, 2016). According to CIRP’s American Freshman: National
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Norms Fall 2017 survey about half (44.9%) of students attending a 4-year private not-forprofit institution attend within 100 miles or less (2019).
To introduce the influence of distance, population size, and density to the models,
geographic and population data provided in IPEDS was supplemented with 2010 U.S.
Census data (SF3 files) using the Missouri Census Data Center’s Circular Area Profiles
(CAPS) application (Missouri Census Data Center, 2017). CAPS enables the researcher
to obtain population estimates and population density estimates within a 100-mile and
200-mile radius of an institution’s zip code according to 2010 U.S. Census data (the most
recent census applicable for the significant majority of institutions that have implemented
a reset).
Population and population density information were collected as follows:
1. For each institution, the zip code of the main campus was identified and looked
up in CAPS (Missouri Census Data Center, 2019). IPEDS provided
o Institution’s zip code
o U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Region
2. The following data points were captured and recorded, directly appending the
IPEDS data analysis file from Step 8 above:
o Population in 200 miles
o Population in 100 miles
o Population density in 200 miles
o Population density in 100 miles
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3. Calculated fields were added to compare the local population (within 100 miles)
to the more distant population (between 100 and 200 miles) of the zip code where
the institution is located.
o Percent of 200 miles population in 100-miles population
o Ratio of 100 miles density to 200-miles density
Data Analysis
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between measures of
sticker price elasticity and the change in first-year student enrollment, change in net
revenue from first-year students, and change of first-year students who are Pell-eligible
following a tuition reset using multivariate binary logistic and linear (OLS) regression
models. The effects of advertising will be explored as an intervening variable. It will add
to the body of knowledge by characterizing the outcomes of tuition resets and
investigating the two roles of price as a signal of quality or as a signal of sacrifice.
Following the completion of data collection, we proceed with the data analysis in
three phases:


Phase 1 provides descriptive statistics.



Phase 2 performs binary logistic regression analysis.



Phase 3 performs multivariate linear regression analysis.



Because advertising data is only available for a subset of institutions, each
regression in Phase 2 and Phase 3 is performed twice, first without advertising (a
larger sample) and then with advertising (a smaller sample).
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Phase 1: Descriptive Analysis Procedure
In Phase 1, a preliminary analysis will characterize the results of tuition resets
using descriptive methods such as frequencies and measures of central tendency. The
results of this analysis will be informative to academics and practitioners seeking to
understand the frequency and scope of potential outcomes for tuition resets. The
following frequency tables will be provided through analysis using Microsoft Excel on
the analysis data set:


Number of tuition resets per year, for each year of the period of observation



Institutional control of institutions performing tuition resets



BEA Statistical regions where tuition resets occur



Characteristics of institutions performing a tuition reset



Range of outcomes from performing a tuition reset

Phase 2: Binary Logistic Regression Procedure
In phase 2, binary logistic regression analysis will be performed in RStudio
(RStudio, 2019) to explore research questions 1 and 2. Binary logistic regression is a
statistical method used to predict the log-likelihood of an event occurring for a given
entity (Hosmer et al., 2013; Lang, 1999). Binary logistic regression assumes the
dependent variable is dichotomous (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education,
2019). Pertaining to research question 1, the Reset_Success_Enrollment variable was
defined to be 1 if 5% or more first-year students were enrolled in the year of the reset,
and 0 if not. Pertaining to research question 2, the Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue
variable was defined to be 1 if 5% or more first-year students were enrolled in the year of
the reset, and 0 if not. The data analysis procedure is as follows employing a purposeful
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step-up strategy drawing in variables from the larger data set (Bursac et al., 2008; GraceMartin, 2014) as described in Appendix B:
1. Export the Excel-based data collection file into a .csv file.
2. Run descriptive statistics for each variable and ensure datatypes are detected
properly. Recast variables as necessary.
3. Run Pearson’s Product Moment correlation to identify possible variables that
influence the Reset_Success_Enrollment and Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue
variables. Variables with a p-value of .1 or lower will be considered of interest.
4. Given variables of interest, run GLM Binary logistic regressions according to
each research question. Observations with missing data are eliminated in a rowwise basis.
o Question 1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in
first-year student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
o Question 2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition
reset?
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Table 2
Binary logistic regression configuration for research questions 1 and 2
Research
Independent
Other independent variables
Question
Variable of
interest
R1.
PED_Sticker
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT

R2.

PED_Sticker

ViabilityRatio_YearPrior
X200Density
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT

Dependent
variable
Reset_Success_
Enrollment
Reset_Success_
NetRevenue

App_Trend
DiscountRate_YearPrior
Equity_Ratio_YearPrior
PercentPell_YearPrior
X200Population
StickerPrice_YearPrior
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior
Year_of_Reset
Note: Independent variables of interest found during correlation analysis.

Interpretation of the binary logistic regression model output involves four steps:
1. To assess model fit, deviance residuals should be examined to ensure they
are evenly distributed around the median (Chapman & Feit, 2015).
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) provides information about model
strength among a given set of data; the lower the AIC, the stronger the
model (Mazerolle, 2007). When no further variables from the analysis set
can be added which lower the AIC, the model is the strongest possible
given the data available. Statistical significance of the model can be
evaluated by implementing a Chi-Square statistic on the Degrees of
Freedom reported in the logistic output (Hosmer & Lemesbow, 1980).
2. After building the logistic model with the lowest possible AIC, the
statistically significant coefficients can be identified and explained as odds
ratios. Coefficients with a p-value of .1 are considered significant. Integer
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variables will be interpreted so that a 1-unit change in quantity will
correspond to a change in the log odds by the amount of the coefficient.
For values that remain, the listing of that variable shows the change in log
odds by the difference from the base level to the level mentioned in the
coefficient (UCLA Institute for Digital Research and Education, 2019).
Next, the log-likelihood coefficients will be transformed to odds ratios by
calculating the exponent of the coefficient.
3. The next step of interpreting the binary logistic regression model is to
calculate the effectiveness of modeled predictions via a confusion matrix
(Chapman & Feit, 2015). For each institution in the model, the research
question-specific logistic regression is run and the applicable
Enrollment_Success_Prob_Score and
FYNetRevenue_Success_Prob_Score field will be populated with a value
of 0 to 1 with the predicted likelihood of success. These calculations will
be compared to the actual Reset_Success_Enrollment and
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue fields in a confusion matrix as follows:

Actual
False
Actual
True

Predicted
False

Predicted
True

True
Negative
(TN)
False
Negative
(FN)

False
Positive
(FP)
True
Positive
(TP)

4. Model accuracy, precision, recall, specificity and false positive rates are
calculated to assess varied dimensions of the model’s performance.
Following are the definitions and calculation steps for each of these
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diagnostic statistics drawn from the confusion matrix (Hosmer et al., 2013;
Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015):


Accuracy is calculated as follows (Analytics Vidhya Content Team,
2015; Field, 2013; UCLA Institute for Digital Research and
Education, 2019):
Accuracy = (True Positive + True Negative) /
(True Positive + True Negative+ False Positive + False Negative)



Precision pertains to the accuracy of predicting positive outcomes.
Precision is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015):



Precision = True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive)
Recall pertains to the ratio of all positive cases that are accurately
predicted by the model. Recall is calculated as follows (Saito &
Rehmsmeier, 2015):
Recall = True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative)



Specificity indicates how often negative values were predicted.
Specificity is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier, 2015):
Specificity = True Negative / (True Negative + False Positive)



False Positive Rate indicates how often positive outcomes are
predicted relative to the total number of actual negative events. The
False Positive Rate is calculated as follows (Saito & Rehmsmeier,
2015):
False Positive Rate = False Positive / (False Positive + True
Negative)
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The F-Score is a harmonic mean of precision and recall which
rates the predictive power of a model from 1 (perfect predictions)
to 0 (predicts perfectly incorrectly) (Hosmer et al., 2013):
F Score = (2*Recall*Precision) / (Recall + Precision)

Phase 3: Multivariate Linear Regression Procedure
In phase 3, multivariate linear regression (ordinary least squares-OLS) will be
performed in RStudio (RStudio, 2019) to explore research questions 3, 4, and 5.
Multivariate linear regression (OLS) is a statistical method used to predict levels of a
dependent variable based on levels of an independent variable (Chapman & Feit, 2015;
Field, 2013; Salkind, 2017). Similar to the logistic regression, model variables were
‘discovered’ through a purposeful step-up strategy drawing in variables from the larger
data set (Field, 2013; Grace-Martin, 2014; Montgomery et al., 2006) as defined in
Appendix B. The multivariate linear regression (OLS) data analysis procedure is as
follows:
1. Export the Excel-based data collection file into a .csv file.
2. Run descriptive statistics for each variable and ensure datatypes are detected
properly. Recast variable as necessary. Identify and remove extreme outliers using
boxplots and remove them from the data set (Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013).
3. Run the Shapiro-Wilk normality test for all integer variables to understand skew
and normality within each variable. If the p-value is less than .10, the variable
distribution is assumed to be normal (Chapman & Feit, 2015). While variables
without a normal distribution were not removed from consideration in building
linear models, it was considered important for the researcher to understand
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possible sources of bias which could skew modeling results (Bommae, 2015;
Field, 2013).
4. Run Pearson’s Product Moment correlation to identify possible variables that
influence the dependent variable for each research question. Variables with a pvalue of .1 or lower are of interest and considered for insertion in the model.
5. Given the list of variables of interest discovered in point 4 above, run OLS
multivariate linear regressions according to each research. Observations with
missing data are eliminated in a row-wise basis.


Question 3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?



Question 4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset?



Question 5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year Pell-eligible
student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?



Question 6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment
for institutions implementing a tuition reset?

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

48

Table 3
Multivariate linear regression (OLS) configuration for research questions 2,4,5 and 6
Research Independent
Other independent variables
Dependent variable
Question Variable of
interest
R3

PED_Sticker

R4

PED_Sticker

R5

PED_Sticker

R6

PED_Sticker
_XFR

AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
App_Trend
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT App_Trend
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior
DiscountRate_Trend_2YearPrior
StickerPrice_CHG
StickerPrice_YearPrior
AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior
App_Trend
PercentPell_YearPrior
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT

Enrolled_CHG_PCT

Net_FY_TFRevenue
_CHG_PCT

PercentPell_CHG

XFR_Enroll_PCT_C
HG

Note: Independent variables of interest found during correlation analysis.

6. To verify purposeful variable selection did not introduce multicollinearity,
calculate a variance inflation factor—or VIF—for each variable in the model
(Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2019; Grigsby, 2018). If a variable’s VIF is
greater than 10, consider options for variable replacement and return to Step 4.
Interpretation of the multivariate linear regression models (OLS) output involves
only two major steps. First, the Adjusted R-squared indicates what percent of the variance
in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included in the model
(Chapman & Feit, 2015; Field, 2013).
Second, the influence of each independent variable is assessed holding all other
variables constant. Independent variables will be considered statistically significant if
their p-value is less than .10. A coefficient is calculated for each independent variable
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which indicates the strength and directionality of each independent variable’s
relationship.
The coefficient can be read “for each one-unit change in the independent variable,
the dependent variable will change by the coefficient value” (Berenson et al., 1992;
Salkind, 2017). Independent variables that are not statistically significant will be left in
the model to illustrate the model’s predictive power was enhanced by controlling for
purposely selected and relevant variables (Grace-Martin, 2012).
Researcher’s Perspective, Assumptions and Delimitations
All research endeavors assume a certain level of uncertainty inherent in design
and execution. The following are the researcher’s perspective, assumptions, and
delimitations. Proposed mitigations are discussed as applicable.
Researcher’s perspective
The researcher comes to this issue as a strategist in the higher education space.
My previous employment position was as an Associate Vice President of Strategy and
Decision Support for a 4-year private liberal arts institution that considered a range of
price strategies, including the tuition reset. Currently, I serve as the Market Strategy
Analyst for Ruffalo Noel Levitz, a higher education management consulting firm, in the
market research practice. My colleagues at Ruffalo Noel Levitz have advised some
institutions listed in this study that have implemented tuition resets. I am frequently asked
for recommendations about when a tuition reset is advisable. I suspect high sticker price
is increasingly seen as a signal of cost, not quality, among low- and middle-income
families shopping for 4-year private baccalaureate education. Finally, I believe the tuition
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reset strategy can be viable for an increasing minority of 4-year private institutions, but
only after careful analys is given for the very significant risks involved.
Assumptions
This research makes certain assumptions:
First, the list of identified institutions is sufficiently representative of the overall
population of institutions that have attempted tuition resets. Implementing a tuition reset
involves significant risk and depends upon awareness building, so they are publicly
announced.
Second, although IPEDS provides detailed definitions of data elements required
to complete the surveys, different institutions may interpret these uniform instructions in
slightly different ways based on the peculiarities of their business model.
Third, this research assumes that Form 990 data is more reliable than IPEDS data.
When Form 990 data and IPEDS data conflict, the Form 990 data is considered
determinative on the basis it was likely provided by an institution’s finance office
following the annual audit rather than an institutional research office.
Fourth, this research assumes more recent financial data is more reliable than
earlier reported data. Occasionally year-end balance sheet items from a previous year are
different than the corresponding beginning-of-year balance sheet items of the following
year. In such cases, the beginning-of-year balances in the following year are considered
determinative, and the adjustment assumed to be a correction in accounting procedures.
Fifth, this research assumes advertising and promotion expenditures related to a
tuition reset are represented in the advertising and promotion line in institutional Form
990s during the year of announcing the reset.
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Delimitations
This study is delimited to narrow the scope of this study, the analysis will be
performed on 142 identified institutions that have formally announced a tuition reset from
the years 1997 through 2018 (some have performed tuition resets more than once within
the period of observation). This list of institutions was compiled via interviews with
industry experts (Bloom, 2017; S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; L.
Lapovsky, personal communication, March 1, 2016) web site lists (Edvisors, 2017;
Kantrowitz, 2017, 2019; Kottich, 2017), Google searches and Google Alerts. This list is
narrowed further based on the availability of completeness of IPEDS data with regards to
the required variables in all relevant years of observation.
Peers for each of the tuition reset institutions were not identified to form a
benchmark comparison group due to time constraints and the burdens of manual Form
990 data collection. Future studies could include such peer sets consistent with the eventstudy methodology to explore if the results of institutions that implemented a reset varied
from those which did not, under the criteria by which benchmark institutions would be
selected.
The most current data available from IPEDS is currently Fall 2018 (National
Center for Educational Statistics, 2019). Further, only private not-for-profit institutions
will be considered as classified during the year in which the tuition reset took place to
compare tuition reset outcomes to overall changes in sector enrollment. Some institutions
have done tuition resets for specific populations (e.g. only in-state students) or specific
programs (e.g. international students only, certain majors). These institutions have been
removed from the sample as IPEDS data can only be compared at the aggregated
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institutional level. The effects on specific subpopulations cannot be effectively and
reliably isolated.
Many further legitimate research questions regarding the effectiveness of tuition
resets could be asked. Issues of net revenue from overall enrollment (both first-year and
continuing students), changes to the academic profile, student debt loads, sustainability of
enrollment gains when present, effects on persistence to graduation, and impact on
perceptions of quality among diverse audiences are all valid directions for further
research and exploration. However, to maintain a manageable focus for this research,
only the previously referred to research questions will be addressed in this study. To
answer these extended questions, a deeper literature review, different data gathering
tasks, and different analytical procedures would be required.
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Chapter 4 - Results
In service industries such as higher education, price serves both as an indicator of
quality and as an indicator of cost to consumers. As industries mature or transition to
decline, consumers may transition from seeing a high price as a signal of quality to a
signal of cost. In the higher education market, institutions find themselves increasingly
competing based on published price as competitive pressures increase. Tuition resets,
which a growing number of colleges have implemented or are considering, offer a natural
experiment through which the influence of sticker price on facets of enrollment behavior
can be explored. This study examines the relationship of sticker price sensitivity (as
measured by sticker price elasticity) on different measures of tuition reset success for
private not-for-profit institutions.
Section 1 presents descriptive statistics and frequency distribution information to
characterize institutions that implement tuition resets and provide an assessment of the
range of outcomes they have realized. Section 2 provides the preliminary results of
multivariate logistic regressions in support of research questions 1 and 2. Section 3
presents the results of multivariate linear regression in support of research questions 3, 4,
and 5. Sections 2 and 3 analyze models both with and without advertising and promotion
variables. The chapter concludes with an analysis of three additional questions arising
through the research process. The chapter examines evidence from the sample data to
address these questions and suggest areas for future in-depth research:


How influential is the year of the tuition reset? Is there evidence that resets
following the Great Recession (as demarcated by 2010) are successful more
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frequently in terms of increased first-year student enrollment or net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students than those before the Great Recession?


Are there “threshold effects” which pertain to the amount of a tuition reset?
Beyond looking for a linear correlation between the amount of the tuition reset
and enrollment increases, this question seeks evidence that tuition resets need to
be of a certain size to begin with before positive effects could even be expected.



Do tuition resets have an impact on retention? An increase in the retention of
continuing students helps offset the cost of lost revenue from near full-pay and
full-pay students.

Section 1. Frequency Distribution Results
Tuition reset announcements frequently refer to both the fall term and a
hyphenated academic year when the new pricing is in effect. The academic year bridges
two calendar years. The earlier calendar year indicates the fall term when the new tuition
level and enrollment results from the first year of recruiting are measured. The second
calendar year indicates the spring term and is when the final financial results of a tuition
reset are measured. An institution's fiscal year is aligned with this later year. This study
uses the hyphenated format for the year of a reset in this section to aid future researchers
seeking to replicate this study. The early year is needed to obtain the correct institutional
characteristics, admissions and enrollment IPEDS files. The later year is needed to obtain
the associated financial IPEDS data and Form 990 data.
Within the 24-year span from academic years 1996-1997 to 2019-2020, 142
institutions implemented some form of tuition reset. Tuition resets were rare through
2010-2011, with some intervening years (1997-1998, 2000-2001,2001-2002, 2007-2008)
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having no resets at all. However, starting in 2011-2012 the number of tuition resets
increased to six or more each year. In all but three years, private not-for-profit, 4-year or
above institutions implemented most tuition resets. Figure 1 and Table 4 present the
number of institutions of all types implementing tuition resets at some level (institutional
or for select programs) for each year where one or more tuition resets took place.
Figure 1

Institutions announcing tuition resets
FY1997 to FY2021 (N=142)
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Table 4
Number of tuition resets each year
Year of Reset
All Resets

Private not-for-profit,
Other control
4-year or above
1996-1997
2
2
0
1998-1999
3
3
0
1999-2000
4
2
2
2002-2003
2
2
0
2003-2004
2
2
0
2004-2005
3
2
1
2005-2006
1
1
0
2006-2007
1
1
0
2008-2009
3
3
0
2009-2010
2
2
0
2010-2011
1
1
0
2011-2012
5
5
0
2012-2013
8
8
0
2013-2014
15
11
4
2014-2015
13
12
1
2015-2016
20
14
6
2016-2017
14
3
11
2017-2018
6
5
1
2018-2019
24
17
7
2019-2020
10
10
0
2020-2021
3
3
0
Note: Tuition resets counted at an institutional level only. The source is IPEDS Data Center.
72 private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented tuition resets between
2002-2003 and 2017-2018 are of special interest for this study.

Over the last 24 years, all types of institutions—public or private, 2-year or 4year, colleges or universities—implemented tuition resets. However, private not-forprofit, 4-year or above institutions implemented 77% of resets. Tuition resets at public
institutions can be system-wide, but also in response to mandates from public officials.
Table 5 presents the frequency of tuition resets by institutional control as reported
through IPEDS.
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Table 5
Institution tuition resets by institutional control
N
Percent
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above
109
77%
Public, 4-year or above
23
16%
Private for-profit, 4-year or above
3
2%
Administrative Unit
3
2%
Public, 2-year
2
1%
Private for-profit, 2-year
1
1%
Private not-for-profit, 2-year
1
1%
Total
142
Note: Tuition resets counted at an institutional level only. The source is IPEDS Data Center.

Tuition resets also occurred throughout all BEA statistical regions of the United
States, especially in the Southeast (30%), Great Lakes (19%), and Mid East (15%). Table
6 presents the count and percentage of tuition resets that occur within each BEA
statistical region as reported through IPEDS. For greater context, Table 6 also presents
the number of institutions in each region from all sectors. Multi-region refers to
institutions with major campuses in multiple states or a significant online presence.
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Table 6
Tuition resets by BEA Statistical regions
BEA Region
Total
Reset
Institutions Institutions

Percent of
Reset
Institutions

Southeast

1,540

42

30%

Percent of
institutions
in each
region
doing reset
3%

Great Lakes
Mid East

895
1,037

27
21

19%
15%

3%
2%

Far West

889

17

12%

2%

Plains

519

11

8%

2%

New England

351

10

7%

3%

Southwest
Rocky
Mountains
Multi-region

656
246

9
3

6%
2%

1%
1%

5

2

1%

40%

States Included

AL AR FL GA KY
LA MS NC SC TN
VA WV
IL IN MI OH WI
DE DC MD NJ NY
PA
AK CA HI NV OR
WA
IA KS MN MO NE
ND SD
CT ME MA NH RI
VT
AZ NM OK TX
CO ID MT UT WY
Multiple states or
online

Total
6,138
142
Note: Tuition resets counted at the institutional and program level. The source is IPEDS Data
Center

Of the 142 identified institutions that implemented any form of a tuition reset, 72
private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions implemented tuition resets at the
institution level between academic years 2002-2003 and 2017-2018. Data collection for
this study focused on this group of 72 institutions. Table 7 summarizes several important
characteristics of these 72 institutions.
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Table 7
Characteristics of institutions implementing tuition reset strategy
N
25th
Median
Average
75th
Percentile
Percentile
72
$19,688
$25,475
$28,120
$37,464
Sticker price before reset
Sticker price change by
72
-9.92%
-17%
-18%
-24%
percent
Sticker price change in
72
($2,130)
($4,084)
($4,967)
($6,956)
dollars
$15,760
$21,180
$23,153
$29,585
Sticker Price following reset 72
72
3,396,204
6,038,902
8,720,441
9,612,004
Population 100 miles
72
14,866,474
20,830,766
22,756,810 27,099,683
Population 200 miles
Population Density 100
72
128
210
367
440
miles
Population Density 200
72
141
197
260
334
miles
71
(3.37)
(0.28)
(0.07)
4.07
Sticker Price Elasticity
Transfer Sticker Price
56
(1.77)
0.27
2.26
5.04
Elasticity
66
0.50
0.80
0.90
1.04
Net Price Elasticity
Advertising and Promotion
43
$61,477
$186,812
$439,693
$453,197
Spend Year Prior
Change in Advertising
37
-27.05%
2%
22%
33%
Spend in Percent Year Prior
63
47.50
65.00
58.49
76.50
Equity Ratio Year Prior
50
0.08
0.53
0.79
1.26
Viability Ratio Year Prior
Change in Net Assets Ratio
55
(0.00)
0.02
0.05
0.09
Year Prior
50
0.40
2.14
2.99
3.86
FIT SCORE CFI Year Prior
51
-8.03%
6%
28%
40%
Application Trend
71
-33.14%
-6%
0%
12%
Enrolled Trend
61
-19.72%
6%
181%
42%
Transfer Enrolled Trend
67
17.67%
36%
35%
53%
Discount Rate Prior
Discount Rate Trend-2
66
-2.51%
2%
1%
8%
Years Prior
63
37%
47%
51%
66%
Percent Pell - Year Prior
Note: 72 Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented a tuition reset
between 2002-2003 and 2017-2018. Interpret each row independently.

Important observations of tuition reset and institution characteristics from Table 7 are:


The average tuition reset amount is 18% of the sticker price.



The average tuition reset expressed in dollars is $4,967, or approximately $5,000.
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The range of sticker price elasticity for first-year students (from -3.37 to 4.07) and
transfer students (from -1.77 to 5.04) suggests a wide range of behavioral
responses to sticker prices in the years preceding a tuition reset. Negative
elasticities mean when sticker price increases, the number of enrolled students
decreases. Elasticities less than -1 reflect ‘elastic’ behavior (for a 1% decline in
price, there is a larger percent increase in enrollment). For elasticities between 0
and -1, consumers are price inelastic (for a 1% drop in price, there is a smaller
percentage increase in enrollment). If the elasticity is positive, the market is
starting to reflect Veblen effects where a higher price can increase enrollment. See
Appendix C for more detail.



The financial condition of institutions implementing resets is leaning towards the
lower middle range of the Austen Group’s FIT Score Range; a scale from -4 to 10.
CFI scores for many institutions performing a tuition reset range from .40 to 3.86.
Falling in the lower ranges of the scale indicates the need for “thorough review of
institutional effectiveness” or “significant changes needed to achieve their
mission” (The Austen Group, 2019b).
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Table 8 summarizes the actual tuition reset results for the 72 private not-for-profit
institutions. The potential risks involved with tuition resets becomes clear in that at the
25th percentile many outcome measures are highly undesirable.
Table 8
Range of actual outcomes from tuition reset
N

25th
Median
Average
75th
Percentile
Percentile
Applications Change in percent
57
-7%
8%
19%
25%
Applications Change count
57
(29)
119
215
298
Change in Yield
57
-4%
0%
3%
5%
NACUBO Discount Rate Change
57
-15%
-5%
-6%
3%
Enrollment Change Percent (Y0)
70
-12%
0%
19%
33%
Net Revenue Change Percent (Y0)
57
-26%
-4%
15%
23%
Percent FY Pell
57
-5%
1%
1%
7%
Retention Change
60
-2%
2%
5%
9%
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent
61
-20%
6%
18%
42%
Note: Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions that implemented a tuition reset between
FY2003 and FY2018. Interpret each row independently.

We can observe the following for institutions with available outcomes data:


Institutions implementing a tuition reset expect to see an increase in completed
applications, but at the 25th percentile, there is a decline of 7%.



At the 25th percentile of all institutions that implemented a tuition reset, yield
rates decreased by 4% or more. The decrease in yield can offset gains from
increased applications, or compound losses if applications were the same or
lower.



Most institutions saw a reduction in the NACUBO Discount Rate, which is
positive and expected. However, at the 75th percentile institutions had an increase
in discount rate. This could be a result if institutions reduced both sticker price
and average net price.



The median result of a tuition reset is a loss of 4% of revenue from first-year
students. Considering an additional loss from continuing full-pay and near full-
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pay students, the potential for revenue loss from a tuition reset should be taken
quite seriously.


Over half of institutions implementing a tuition reset experienced a 1% or greater
increase in first-year Pell student enrollment in the first year of the new lower
tuition.



Half of the institutions which implemented a tuition reset experienced an increase
of 2% or more increase in first-year student retention.



Half of the institutions which implemented a tuition reset experienced an increase
in transfer student enrollment of 6% or more.
Positive outcomes from tuition resets are possible, but they are not without

assuming significant risk. Identifying factors that predict successful outcomes becomes
an important task.
Section 2. Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression Results
Multivariate logistic regression is used to identify the influence of independent
variables on the likelihood of an event occurring (Stoltzfus, 2011). Research Questions 1
and 2 analyze the influence of sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) on the likelihood of
increasing first-year students enrolled (Reset_Success_Enrollment)(R1) and net tuition
and fee revenue from first-year students (Reset_Success_Revenue)(R2). Because
advertising and promotion data was available for only 43 of the 72 private not-for-profit
institutions, two models are developed using purposeful stepwise selection both with and
without the advertising and promotion variables for each research question. Following are
the results of each model:
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Research Question 1
The most basic assessment of the success of a tuition reset is whether it is likely to
result in more first-year students enrolling. Assuming the reason for considering a tuition
reset is that the institution perceives sticker price sensitivity of prospective students, R1
asks:
R1: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in
first-year student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
Because this question pertains to the probability of an event, namely the
successful recruitment of more first-year students (Reset_Success_Enrollment), we use
the following logistic regression model (Stoltzfus, 2011) to test the influence of sticker
price elasticity (PED_Sticker) on the likelihood of increased enrollment without
considering the influence of advertising:
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε
where,
Logit(y) is the log odds that a tuition reset will result in a 5% or greater increase in
first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment).
α is constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
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X2 is the viability ratio in the year prior to a tuition reset (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior),
assessing how strategically the institution manages financial resources, including
debt, to advance the institution’s mission.
X3 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior)
X4 is the population density in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing
a tuition reset (X200Density).
The logistic model runs on a sample of 45 institutions with valid data. Table 9
presents the results.
Table 9
Logistic regression analysis of FY enrollment success without advertising variables
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence
Regression
Interval
Coefficient
PED_Sticker
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior
PercentPell_YearPrior
X200Density
N
AIC
Loglikelihood
Dispersion

Actual False
Actual True

1.0021
2.1839
1.0376
1.0032
45
61.935
-25.96742 (5)
1.2983
Predicted False

0.9676-1.0501
1.185-5.3958
1.0003-1.0839
0.9991-1.0078
Chi-Squared
Degrees of Freedom
p-value

17
8

6
13

0.1200
2.0850
1.8340
1.4590
10.4261
4
0.0338

p-value
0.9042
0.0371**
0.0666*
0.1445

Predicted True

Accuracy
0.6818
Precision
0.6842
Recall
0.6190
False Positive Rate
0.2609
Specificity
0.7391
Error
0.3182
F-Score
0.6500
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

The results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is not associated with a
higher probability of increasing enrollment 5% or more first-year students
(Reset_Success_Enrollment). The significant explanatory variables are
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior and PercentPell_YearPrior. The viability ratio provides an
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indicator of the financial vitality of an institution. As an institution’s vitality ratio in the
year prior to a tuition reset increase, the odds of enrolling 5% or more first-year students
(Reset_Success_Enrollment) increase by a factor of 2.1839. The federal Pell grant
program helps low-income families afford college, and thus the percent of an institution’s
first-year class that is Pell-eligible be a proxy for serving low-income students. For each
percent of an institution’s first-year cohort being Pell-eligible in the year prior to a tuition
reset (PercentPell_YearPrior), the odds of enrolling 5% or more first-year students
increase by a factor of 1.0376.
To assess the model fit, we note the model’s Chi-Squared is 10.4261 and the pvalue is 0.0371 and significant at the 5% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC)
statistic is a relative measure of model fit with lower values preferred to higher. In the
next model, the AIC declines which indicate a better “fit” of results by the explanatory
variables with the addition of advertising variables.
Ratios of the confusion matrix characterize the efficacy of explanatory variables
employed in the model. The model predicted outcomes for Reset_Success_Enrollment
with 68% accuracy. When the model predicts positive outcomes (Precision), they were
correct 68% of the time. The model’s False Positive Rate (e.g. a positive outcome
predicted when a negative result occurred) was 26%. As previously defined, the F-Score
is a harmonic mean of precision and recall which rates the predictive power of a model
from 1 (perfect predictions) to 0 (predicts perfectly incorrectly). The F-Score for this
model is 0.6500 enabling comparison to other models.
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The second proposed model which includes advertising variables is as follows:
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε
where,
Logit(y) is the log odds that a tuition reset will result in 5% or greater increase in
first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Enrollment).
α is constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X3 is the population density in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing
a tuition reset (X200Density).
X4 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior).
The logistic model runs with a sample of 32 institutions with valid data. Table 10
shows the results.
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Table 10
Logistic regression analysis of FY enrollment success with advertising
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence
Regression
Interval
Coefficient
PED_Sticker
0.7584
0.5697-0.9328
-0.2766
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PC
T
X200Density

16.5420

2.6728-292.3708

2.8059

1.0069

1.001-1.0145

0.0069

PercentPell_YearPrior
N
AIC

0.9550
32
40.064

0.8915-1.0079
Chi-Squared
Degrees of
Freedom
p-value

-0.0460
14.1724
4

Loglikelihood
Dispersion

Actual False
Actual True

-15.03120
(5)
1.1135
Predicted
False
15
3

p-value
0.0242*
*
0.0158*
*
0.0375*
*
0.1278

0.0068

Predicted True
2
12

Accuracy
0.8438
Precision
0.8571
Recall
0.8000
False Positive Rate
0.1176
Specificity
0.8824
Error
0.1563
F-Score
0.8276
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

The results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant
explanatory variable of tuition reset enrollment success (Reset_Success_Enrollment), as
defined by a 5% or greater increase in first-year students. The more price-sensitive an
institution’s population of prospective students are (as indicated by a 1 unit decrease in
PED_Sticker) the odds of tuition success increase by a factor of .7584.
However, the effect of sticker price elasticity is minor (.7584) relative to increases
in advertising and promotion spending (AdvertisingPromotion_CHG_PCT) and
population density within a 20-mile radius of the institution implementing a tuition reset
(X200Density). For each percent increase in advertising and promotion spending, the
odds of successfully increasing first-year student enrollment by 5% or more increase by a
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factor of 16.542. For each percent increase in population density within 200 miles radius
of campus, the odds of a successful reset increase by a factor of 1.0069.
The Chi-squared of the model is 14.1724 and the p-value is 0.0068, which is
significant at the 1% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) statistic, a relative
measure of model fit where lower values are preferred, is 40.064, which reflects marked
improvement compared to the previous model’s AIC of 61.935.
Ratios of the confusion matrix for the model with advertising variables compare
favorably to the previous model in terms of the efficacy of predictions. The model
predicts outcomes for Reset_Success_Enrollment with 84% accuracy, a substantive
improvement over 68% from the previous model. Positive outcomes are predicted
(Precision) correctly 86% of the time, a substantial improvement over 68% in the
previous model. The False Positive Rate was (e.g. a positive outcome predicted when a
negative result occurred) 12%, which is also an improvement over the 26% in the earlier
model. The F-Score of this model is 0.8276, higher than 0.6500 in the previous model.
Including the percent change in advertising and promotion spending improved the
predictive power of this model by each measure.
Based on these models, sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a statistically
significant influence on tuition reset success (Reset_Success_Enrollment). High
population density (X200Density) and more advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) also increase the odds of successful tuition resets
substantively. If advertising and promotion spending are not considered, a higher
percentage of low-income students as represented by Pell-eligibility
(PercentPell_YearPrior) in an institution’s incoming first-year student body increases the
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probability of tuition reset success (Reset_Success_Enrollment) indicating the Pell
students are likely to be sticker-price sensitive.
Research Question 2
A second basic assessment of the success of a tuition reset is whether the strategy
is likely to result in an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students. An
institution can successfully recruit more first-year students attracted by a lower sticker
price, but also lose net tuition and fee revenue by additionally giving substantive
discounts. Therefore, the second research question is:
R2: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition
reset?
Because this question pertains to the probability of an event, in this case, a 5% or
greater increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Reset_Success_Revenue), the following logistic regression model (Stoltzfus, 2011),
using stepwise variable selection, tests the influence of sticker price elasticity on the
likelihood of increased net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, without
considering the influence of advertising:
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β 5X5+ β 6X6 + α
where,
Logit(y) is the log odds a tuition reset will reset in 5% or greater increase in net
tuition and fee revenue from first-year student enrollment (Reset_Success_Revenue).
α is constant.

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

70

X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is Percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible in the year prior to a tuition
reset (PercentPell_YearPrior).
X3 is the change in applications between years -3 and -1 expressed as a percentage of
applications in year -3 (App_Trend)
X4 is the viability ratio in the year prior to a tuition reset (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior),
assessing how strategically the institution manages financial resources, including
debt, to advance the institution’s mission.
X5 represents the discount rate as the first-year NACUBO Discount Rate during year
-1 (DiscountRate_YearPrior).
X6 is the Sticker price in the year prior to a reset (StickerPrice_YearPrior), which is
the sum of published tuition, fees, room and board. The sticker price is an attribute of
the institution resetting tuition separate from sticker price elasticity which is an
attribute of the first-year student population considering an institution. This variable
is included with the presumption the higher the sticker price is prior to a tuition reset,
the more net revenue will potentially be gained through a tuition reset.
The first logistic model for R2—without considering the advertising and
promotion spending variables—runs on a sample of 37 institutions with valid data. Table
11 below shows the results.
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Table 11
Logistic regression analysis of FY net revenue success without advertising spending variables
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence
Regression
p-value
Interval
Coefficient
PED_Sticker
1.0538
0.9474-1.2112
0.0524
0.3794
PercentPell_YearPrior
1.0221
0.9736-1.0788
0.0219
0.3862
App_Trend
0.7639
0.2331-2.7518
-0.2693
0.6478
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior
1.8948
0.9711-4.4688
0.6391
0.0821*
DiscountRate_Prior
536.7361
1.7121-1215662
6.2860
0.0677*
StickerPrice_YearPrior
0.9999
0.9997-1.0000
-0.0001
0.1058
N
37
Chi-Squared
7.6941
AIC
56.266
Degrees of
6
Freedom
Loglikelihood
-21.1332 (7) p-value
0.2614
Dispersion
1.4089
Predicted
Predicted True
False
Actual False
Actual True

18
7

4
8

Accuracy
0.7027
Precision
0.6667
Recall
0.5333
False Positive Rate
0.1818
Specificity
0.8182
Error
0.2973
F-Score
0.5926
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

Results show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a
statistically significant influence on the probability of tuition reset success measured by
5% or more increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Reset_Success_Revenue). While the viability ratio (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior) and
discount rate (DiscountRate_Prior) are significant, the model’s fit remains poor. The Chisquared is only 7.6941 and the p-value is 0.2614, which is not significant at any
conventional significance level.
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The second proposed model—which includes the advertising spending variable—
is as follows:
Logit(y) = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5+ β 6X6 + ε
where,
Logit(y) is the log odds a tuition reset will result in 5% or greater increase in firstyear student net tuition and fee revenue (Reset_Success_Revenue) or not.
α is constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X3 is the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible (PercentPell_YearPrior)
X4 is the population in the area within 200 miles of the campus implementing a
tuition reset (X200Population).
X5 is the equity ratio, which measures an institution’s leverage. The equity ratio
compares total assets to total equity. Higher equity ratios imply a more conservative
approach to financial management and lower debt. Equity ratio year prior
(Equity_Ratio_YearPrior) is the equity ratio of an institution at year -1.
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X6 is the year a reset occurs (Year_of_Reset). It indicates the year of the fall semester
when the newly reduced published sticker price is put into effect. A positive
correlation means the more recent the reset the greater the likelihood of success.
The second logistic model for R2—with consideration of the advertising and
promotion spending variables—is run on a sample of 30 institutions with valid data.
Results are presented in Table 12 below.
Table 12
Logistic regression analysis of FY Net Revenue Success considering advertising and
promotion variables
Odds Ratio
95% Confidence Regression
Interval
Coefficient
PED_Sticker
0.8876
0.7078-1.0581
-0.1192
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
8.4963
1.4627-168.6628
2.1400
PercentPell_YearPrior
0.9934
0.919-1.0709
-0.0066
X200Population
1.0000
0.9999-1.0000
0.0000
Equity_Ratio_YearPrior
1.0626
0.9911-1.1704
0.0607
Year_of_Reset
2.8640
1.2265-11.7298
1.0520
N
30
Wald Chi Square
14.4268
AIC
39.954
Degrees of
6
Freedom
Loglikelihood
-12.9770 (7) p-value
0.0252
Dispersion
1.1284
Predicted
Predicted True
False
Actual False
Actual True

15
3

p-value
0.2222
0.0612*
0.8606
0.1798
0.1231
0.0599*

3
9

Accuracy
0.8000
Precision
0.7500
Recall
0.7500
False Positive Rate
0.1667
Specificity
0.8333
Error
0.2000
F-Score
0.7500
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

The results show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a
statistically significant influence on the probability of tuition reset success in terms of net
tuition and fee revenue, from first-year students (Reset_Success_Revenue) using a 5% or
greater increase as criteria for success. Increased spending in advertising and promotion
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(AdvertisingPromotion_CHG_PCT) and the year of reset (Year_of_Reset) have
significant statistical influence. For each percent increase in advertising and promotion
spending in the year prior to a reset, the odds of increasing the net tuition and fee revenue
5% or more will increase by a factor of 8.4963. For each year beyond 2001, the odds of
increasing net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students increased by a factor of
2.8640. We will examine the influence of year on tuition reset outcomes more closely in
the next section.
The model provides a good fit as the Chi-squared is 14.4268 and the p-value is
0.0252, which is significant at the 5% level. The Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC)
statistic, a relative measure of model fit where lower values are preferred, is 39.954
representing a marked improvement compared to the previous model’s AIC of 56.266.
To characterize the efficacy of predictions provided by this model, we examine
ratios of the confusion matrix. The model predicts outcomes for Reset_Success_Revenue
with 80% accuracy (meaning both positive and negative outcomes are predicted
correctly). Positive outcomes are predicted (Precision) correctly 75% of the time. The
False Positive Rate, measuring the chance of a positive outcome predicted when a
negative result occurred, is 17%. The F-Score of this model which includes advertising is
0.75 which is an improvement over 0.5926 in the previous model. By each measure,
including the percent change in advertising and promotion, spending improves the
predictive performance of this model over the first model for R2.
Based on these models, there is no evidence that sticker price elasticity in the year
prior to a tuition reset influences the likelihood of having a 5% or more increase in net
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students. However, an increase in advertising and
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promotion spending in the year preceding a reset increases the odds of institutions
realizing 5% or more increases in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students in
the first year of the reset.
Section 3. Multivariate Linear Regression Results (OLS)
While logistic regression asks if an independent variable increases the likelihood
of an event occurring, linear regression asks a related but separate question; does an
increase in levels of an independent variable influence the levels of a dependent variable.
In this section, we use multivariate linear regression (OLS) to investigate if sticker price
elasticity can be used to predict the change in the number of first-year students enrolled
(R3), the change in the amount of net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(R4), the percent of first-year students enrolled that are Pell-eligible (R5), and the change
in the number of transfer students enrolled (R6) for institutions that implement tuition
resets.
As in the previous section, advertising and promotion spending data is available
for only 43 of the 72 private not-for-profit institutions. Therefore, two models are
developed using purposeful stepwise selection methods, one consideration of the
advertising and promotion spending variables and the other without for each research
question.
Research Question 3
In R1, partial support is found that sticker price elasticity is a significant predictor
of the likelihood of enrolling more first-year students among institutions that perform
tuition resets. Here, the model tests if increasing levels of sticker price elasticity can be
used to predict increasing levels of enrollment:
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R3: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
To predict the percentage change in first-year student enrollment
(Enrolled_CHG_PCT) the following model which does not consider advertising and
promotion spending variables is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable
inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to
collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018).
The model is:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ ε
where,
y is the percent change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) in the
year of a tuition reset.
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population
in the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the
percent change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker
price.
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to
Year -1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted
assets. A positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
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X3 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend), which is
expressed as a percentage growth rate. A positive number indicates an increase in
applications and a negative number indicates a decline.
X4 is the sticker price during the year of a tuition reset announcement
(StickerPrice_YearPrior) as expressed in dollars. Sticker price includes tuition,
fees, room and board.
The first OLS linear regression model for R3—without consideration of the
advertising and promotion spending variable—runs on a sample of 44 institutions with
valid data. Table 13 shows the results.
Table13
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student enrollment without considering
advertising and promotion variables
β
Std.
T value
p-value
VIF
Error
PED_Sticker
-0.0128 0.0121 -1.0630
0.2941
1.1168
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior
3.6910
0.6740 5.4760
0.0000 *** 1.0778
StickerPrice_YearPrior
0.0000
0.0000 -0.9040
0.3716
1.2211
App_Trend
0.2574
0.1504 1.7120
0.0949 *
1.3095
N
44
F Statistic
9.438 (4,39)
Adjusted R2
0.4398
p-value
0.0000
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

Results show sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a statistically
significant influence on changes in first-year student enrollment (Enrolled_CHG_PCT).
However, institutions with growth in net assets
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and growth in application volume
(App_Trend) in the years preceding a tuition reset are better positioned to experience
growth in first-year student enrollment. For each 1% increase in net assets, the first-year
student enrollment increases by 3.69%. For each 1% increase in application volume, the
first-year student enrollment increases by 0.2574%.
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To assess the fitness of the model, we observe the model’s p-value is 0.0000,
which is significant at the 1% level. The model explains 43.98% of the variance in the
change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) using the sample of 44
institutions.
The second proposed model, which includes the influence of the advertising and
promotion spending variable, is as follows:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ ε
where,
y is the percent change in first-year students enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT) in the
year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity indicates the percent change
of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
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X4 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend), which is
expressed as a percentage growth rate. A positive number indicates an increase in
applications and a negative number indicates a decline.
The second OLS linear regression model for R3, which includes the advertising and
promotion spending variable is run on a sample of 30 institutions with valid data. Table
14 presents the results.
Table 14
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student enrollment including
advertising and promotion variables
β
Std.
T value p-value
VIF
Error
PED_Sticker
-0.0094 0.0239 -0.3930 0.6979
1.3332
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior 3.8912 0.7225 5.3860 0.0000*** 1.2982
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
0.3247 0.1818 1.7860 0.0862*
1.1607
App_Trend
-0.0270 0.2657 -0.1020 0.9199
1.0949
N
30
F Statistic
11.24 (4,25)
Adjusted R2
0.5855
p-value
0.0000
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

In this second model, sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) does not have a
statistically significant influence on changes in first-year students enrolled
(Enrolled_CHG_PCT). Change in net assets year prior
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and advertising and promotion spending
change by percent (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) do have significant influence. For
each 1% increase in net assets, first-year students enrollment increases by 3.8912%. For
each 1% increase in advertising and promotion spending in the year a reset is announced,
first-year students enrollment increases by 0.3247%.
The model’s fit is good with a p-value of 0.0000, which is significant even at the
1% level. The model explains 58.55% of the variance in the change in first-year students
enrolled (Enrolled_CHG_PCT). Although the sample size is smaller, inclusion of the
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advertising and promotion spending variable enhanced the explanatory power of this
model as the F Statistic increased from 9.438 to 11.240.
Both models for R3 show that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a no
statistically significant influence on the first-year student enrollment
(Enrolled_Change_PCT) at institutions implementing a tuition reset. However, consistent
with suggestions from previous studies, institutions implementing tuition resets which
invest more in advertising and promotion during the year preceding a reset and exhibit
increasing financial health (e.g. a positive change in net assets) are better positioned to
enjoy higher levels of enrollment gain through the tuition reset process.
Research Question 4
In R2 sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) was not a significant predictor of the
likelihood of increasing net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) among institutions that perform tuition resets. Here,
we develop models to examine if sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) can be used to
predict the change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT).
R4: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition
reset?
To predict a change in net tuition and fee revenue on a percentage basis
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) the following model which does not consider the
advertising and promotion spending variables is constructed using stepwise variable
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selection. Variable inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect
from overfitting due to collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the
model (Grigsby, 2018). The model is:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5+ β6X6 + ε
where,
y is the percent change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) in the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population
in the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the
percent change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker
price.
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to
Year -1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted
assets. A positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X3 represents the percentage change in NACUBO Discount Rate between years -3
and -1 (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior).
X4 is the sticker price during the year of a tuition reset announcement
(StickerPrice_YearPrior) as expressed in dollars. Sticker price includes tuition,
fees, room and board.
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X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which is
expressed as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend
indicates an increase in applications.
X6 is the dollar amount of the tuition reset (StickerPrice_CHG). A negative value
for StickerPrice_CHG indicates sticker price was reduced during the tuition reset
event.
The first OLS linear regression model for R4—without consideration of
the advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 44 institutions with
valid data. Table 15 presents the results:
Table 15
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student net revenue without
considering advertising and promotion variables
β
Std.
T value
p-value
VIF
Error
PED_Sticker
0.0070
0.0184
0.3820 0.7050
1.3446
Change_in_Net_Assets
2.5570
0.9388
2.7240 0.0098*** 1.0838
_Ratio_YearPrior
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior
2.0550
0.8719
2.3570 0.0238**
1.4713
StickerPrice_YearPrior
-0.0000
0.0000
-2.1310 0.0398**
1.7251
App_Trend
-0.0289
0.2162
-0.1340 0.8945
1.4029
StickerPrice_CHG
0.0000
0.0000
-1.0580 0.2969
1.4460
N
44
F Statistic
3.575 (6,37)
Adjusted R2
0.2644
p-value
0.0068
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a statistically
significant influence on changes in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The significant variables are Change in Net Assets
Year Prior (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), Discount Rate Trend Two Years
Prior (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), and Sticker Price Year Prior
(StickerPrice_YearPrior). For each 1% increase in net assets, the net tuition and fee
revenue from first year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by
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2.575%. For each 1% increase in discount rate between years -3 and -1
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), first-year student net tuition and fee revenue
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by 2.055%. For each $1,000 increase in
sticker price (StickerPrice_YearPrior) in the year prior to a tuition reset, net tuition and
fee revenue from first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will decrease by
0.03809%. This final point is counter-intuitive as institutions with higher sticker prices
would be expected to benefit the most from a tuition reset.
The model’s p-value is 0.0068, which is significant at the 1% level. The model
explains 26.44% of the variance in the change in net tuition and fee revenue from firstyear students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The F Statistic is comparatively low at
3.575.
The second proposed model—which includes the advertising and promotion
spending variable—is as follows:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5 + ε
where,
y is the percent change in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) in the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 represents the percentage change in NACUBO Discount Rate between years -3
and -1 (DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior).
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X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X4 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which is
expressed as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend
indicates an increase in applications.
The second OLS linear regression model for R4—including the
advertising and promotion spending variables—runs on a sample of 30
institutions with valid data. Table 16 presents the results:
Table 16
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student net revenue considering
advertising and promotion variables
β
Std.
T value
p-value
VIF
Error
PED_Sticker
-0.0539 0.0354 -1.5220 0.1411
1.3394
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior
7.3915 1.9395 3.8110 0.0008*** 2.5106
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_Year
2.3523 1.0666 2.2050 0.0372**
1.2989
Prior
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
0.5667 0.3000 1.8890 0.0710*
1.4508
App_Trend
1.2054 0.5801 2.0780 0.0486**
2.3959
N
30
F Statistic
5.915 (5,24)
Adjusted R2
0.4587 p-value
0.0011
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

The results present no evidence that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) has a
statistically significant influence on changes in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year
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students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). Rather, the significant variables are the twoyear trend of the NACUBO Discount Rate prior to the year of a reset announcement
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior), change in net assets in the year prior to a reset
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), increased spending in advertising and
promotion (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT), and trends in application volume
(App_Trend). For each 1% increase in discount rate between years -3 to -1
(DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior) the percent change in first-year student net tuition and
fee revenue (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase 7.3915%. For each 1%
increase in net assets, the percent change in first-year student net tuition and fee revenue
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by 2.3523%. For each 1% increase in
advertising and promotional spending in year -1 (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) the
percent change in first-year student net tuition and fee revenue
(Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase by .5667%. For each 1% increase in
applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) the percent change in first-year student
net tuition and fee revenue (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) will increase 1.2054%.
The model’s p-value is 0.0011, which is significant even at the 1% level. The
model explains 45.87% of the variance in the change in net tuition and fee revenue from
first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT). The F-statistic is stronger at 5.915
compared to 3.575, compared to the earlier model.
Given both models for R4, no direct support is found that sticker price elasticity
(PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant predictor of the percent change of net tuition
and fee revenue from first-year students (Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT) at institutions
implementing a tuition reset. However, consistent with suggestions from previous studies,
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institutions implementing tuition resets which invest in increased advertising and
promotion during the year preceding a reset, have rising discount rates and increasing
application pools in the years leading up to the year of the tuition reset announcement and
exhibit growth in net assets are better positioned to enjoy increased net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students through the tuition reset process.
Research Question 5
One of the motivations institutions cite for implementing tuition resets is to attract
low-income students which may believe attendance at a private not-for-profit institution
is out of reach. The presumption is if the sticker price was reduced, a larger number of
lower-income students would consider an institution and enroll. Pell grants are incomebased federal education grants which can serve as a proxy for low-income student
segments. The fifth research question is as follows:
R5: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in the percentage of
first-year Pell-eligible student enrollment for institutions implementing a
tuition reset?
To predict changes in the percent of Pell-eligible students in the first-year cohort
(PercentPell_CHG) the following model, which does not consider advertising and
promotion variables, is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable inflation
factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to
collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018).
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The model is:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β5X5 + ε
where,
y is the change in percentage of Pell-eligible students within the first-year student
cohort (PercentPell_CHG) during the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the amount of sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a
percentage of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger
negative coefficients.
X3 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1
(PercentPell_YearPrior).
X4 is the year the tuition reset occurred (Year_of_Reset). This variable uses the year
of the fall term when the new cohort entered.
X5 is the trend in applications between years -3 and -1 (App_Trend) which expressed
as a percentage change in applications. A positive value for App_Trend indicates an
increase in applications.
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The first OLS linear regression model for R5—without consideration of
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 43 institutions with
valid data. Table 17 presents the results:
Table 17
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year Pell student enrollment without
considering advertising
β
Std. Error
T value
p-value
VIF
PED_Sticker
-0.3905
0.2120
-1.8420
0.0736*
1.2679
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
-33.6367
16.0577
-2.0950
0.0431**
1.2864
PercentPell_YearPrior
-0.3297
0.0940
-3.5070
0.0012***
1.3744
Year_of_Reset
-0.7650
0.8196
-0.9330
0.3567
1.2690
App_Trend
-1.3289
2.4187
-0.5490
0.5860
1.4210
N
43
F Statistic
4.796 (5,37)
Adjusted R2
0.3113
p-value
0.0018
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively

The results show evidence that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a
statistically significant influence on changes in the percent of Pell-eligible first-year
students (PercentPell_CHG). For each point sticker price elasticity of first-year students
increases (demarcated by a negative number becoming larger) the percent change of firstyear students being Pell-eligible would increase by 0.3905%.
Other significant predictor variables are the percent change of sticker price
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) and percent Pell-eligible students in the year prior.
(PercentPell_YearPrior). For each 1% reduction in sticker price
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT), the percent change in the percent of Pell-eligible students
among members of the first-year cohort will increase 33.6367%. The existence of Pelleligible students prior to a tuition reset has a significant negative effect on the amount of
change expected. Institutions with high percentages of Pell-eligible students tend to have
smaller changes in the percent Pell-eligible students with a tuition reset in comparison to
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those with lower percent Pell-eligible. This may be because they are already successfully
accessing low-income market segments.
The model’s p-value is 0.0018, which is significant even at the 1% level. The
model explains 31.13% of the variance in the change in the percent of Pell-eligible
students in the first-year cohort (PercentPell_CHG). The F Statistic is 4.796.
The second model—which includes advertising variables—is as follows:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5 + ε
where,
y is the change in percentage of Pell-eligible students within the first-year student
cohort (PercentPell_CHG) during the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X3 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1
(PercentPell_YearPrior).
X4 is the year the tuition reset occurred (Year_of_Reset). This variable uses the year
of the fall term when the new cohort entered.
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X5 is the of sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a
percentage of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger
negative coefficients.
The second OLS linear regression model for R5—including consideration
of advertising and promotion variables—is run on a sample of 38 institutions with
valid data. Table 18 presents the results:
Table 18
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year Pell student enrollment considering
advertising
β
Std. Error
T value
p-value
VIF
PED_Sticker
-0.1384
0.2148
-0.6440
0.5240
1.0257
AdvertsingPromotionSpend
0.0000
0.0000
-3.4600
0.0016*** 1.0291
YearPrior
PercentPell_YearPrior
-0.1930
0.0665
-2.9010
0.0067*** 1.0466
Year_of_Reset
-1.8340
0.8803
-2.0830
0.0453**
1.2071
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
-27.5300
14.0900
-1.9540
0.0595*
1.2012
N
38
F Statistic
4.783 (5,32)
Adjusted R2
0.3383 p-value
0.0022
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a significant
predictor of change in the percent of an institution’s Pell-eligible population
(PercentPell_CHG) for institutions implementing a tuition reset. However, significant
predictors are the increased spending in advertising and promotion
(AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior), the percent of first-year students who are Pelleligible in the year prior to a tuition reset (PercentPell_YearPrior), the year of the tuition
reset, and the percent change in sticker price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT). Although
statistically significant, the effect size of increased advertising and promotion spending is
very small (AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior). Like the prior model, the existence of
Pell-eligible students prior to a tuition reset has a significant negative effect. For each 1%
of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in the year prior to the reset, the
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predicted change in Pell-eligible students in the first year of the reset declines by .1930%.
As suggested earlier, institutions with high percentages of Pell-eligible students tend to
have smaller changes in the percent Pell-eligible students with a tuition reset in
comparison to those with lower percent Pell-eligible. For each 1% reduction in sticker
price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) the percent change in Pell-eligible students among
members of the first-year cohort will increase 27.53%.
The p-value is model is 0.0022, which is significant even at the 1% level. The
model explains 33.83% of the variance in the change in the percent of Pell-eligible
students in the first-year cohort (PercentPell_CHG), which is a slight improvement over
the prior model. The F Statistic is 4.785, again substantially the same.
Based on these models, there is only partial support that sticker price elasticity
(PED_Sticker) is a statistically significant predictor of the percent change of Pell-eligible
first-year students (PercentPell_CHG) enrolling at institutions implementing a tuition
reset. The Percent Pell students prior to the reset (A lower percent the year prior would
predict a larger increase), the amount of Sticker Price change (the greater the reduction
the greater the increase in Pell), and year of reset (the earlier the reset year the greater the
increase in Pell students) are more influential predictors.
Research Question 6
Many private 4-year not-for-profit institutions recruit transfer students in addition
to first-time, first-year students. Such transfers are a critical source of revenue in addition
to first-year students. While transfer students value time-to-complete, 53% indicate
financial concerns may interfere with their ability to finish (Hossler & Bontrager, 2014).
Consistent with our findings in Phase 1, Lapovsky (2019) observed more than half of
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institutions that implemented a tuition reset saw increased transfer student enrollment.
The sixth research question is as follows:
R6: Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the
announcement of a tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
To examine the influence of sticker price elasticity among transfer students
(PED_Sticker_XFR) on changes in the percent change transfer student enrollment
(XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) the following model without advertising and promotion
variables is constructed using stepwise variable selection. Variable inflation factors (VIF)
calculated on independent variables protect from overfitting due to collinearity. Only
variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model (Grigsby, 2018). The first model
which does not consider advertising and promotion variables is:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε
where,
y is the change in percentage of transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT)
during the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
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-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X3 is Population density in the area within 100 miles of the campus implementing a
tuition reset (X100Density). Population density is an estimate of the number of
people living per square mile.
X4 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1
(PercentPell_YearPrior).
The first OLS linear regression model for R6—without consideration of
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 47 institutions with
valid data. Table 19 presents the results:
Table 19
Linear regression analysis of percent change in transfer student enrollment without
considering advertising
PED_Sticker_XFR
Change_in_Net_Assets
_Ratio_YearPrior
X100Density
PercentPell_YearPrior
N
Adjusted R2

β
-0.0003
0.9095
0.0005
0.0065
47
0.2395

Std. Error
0.0054
0.3282
0.0002
0.0037
F Statistic
p-value

T value
-0.0550
2.7710

p-value
0.9565
0.0083***

VIF
1.0808
1.1321

2.5540
1.7250

0.0144**
1.0887
0.0918*
1.1776
4.623 (4,42)
0.0035

Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity among transfer students
(PED_Sticker_XFR) is a significant predictor of change in the percent of transfer
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) for institutions implementing a tuition reset.
However, significant predictors are changes to net assets
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), population density within 100 miles of the
campus (X100Density), and the percent Pell-eligible students in the year prior to the reset
(PercentPell_YearPrior). For each 1% increase in net assets
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(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) the percent change in transfer students
enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase .9095% (not a 2.3523 percentile
increase). More populous regions better position institutions to see an increase in the
number of transfer students enrolled. For each person increase in population density
calculated within the region 100 miles of campus (X100Density), the percent change in
transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase by 0.0004869%.
Institutions that draw a higher percentage of their first-year student cohort from lowincome populations as shown by Pell eligibility are better positioned to see an increase in
the percent change of transfer students enrolled. For each percent of Pell-eligible students
in the first-year cohort during the year prior to a reset, the percent change in transfer
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) increases by .0065%.
The model’s p-value is 0.0035, which is significant even at the 1% level. The
model explains 23.95% of the variance in the percent change in transfer students
enrolled.
The second model—which includes advertising variables—is as follows:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4+ β 5X5 + ε
where,
y is the change in percentage of transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT)
during the year of a tuition reset
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
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X2 is the percent change in advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) reported on the advertising and promotion lines
of an institution’s Form 990 from Year -2 to Year -1. A positive number indicates an
increase in advertising and promotion expenditures.
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X4 is Population density in the area within 100 miles of the campus implementing a
tuition reset (X100Density). Population density is an estimate of the number of
people living per square mile.
X5 is the percent of the first-year student cohort who are Pell-eligible in year -1
(PercentPell_YearPrior).
The second OLS linear regression model for R6—without consideration of
advertising and promotion variables—runs on a sample of 31 institutions with
valid data. Table 20 presents the results:
Table 20
Linear regression analysis of percent change in transfer student enrollment considering
advertising
β
Std. Error T value
p-value
VIF
PED_Sticker_XFR
-0.0139
0.0106
-1.3090 0.2023
1.3025
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT 0.4000
0.1049
3.8130
0.0008***
1.2619
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio
1.4632
0.4121
3.5510
0.0016***
1.1386
_YearPrior
X100Density
0.0007
0.0002
3.4570
0.0020***
1.0936
PercentPell_YearPrior
0.0022
0.0040
0.5440
0.5910
1.1576
N
31
F Statistic
7.628 (5,25)
2
Adjusted R
0.5249
p-value
0.0002
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

96

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity among transfer students
(PED_Sticker_XFR) is a significant predictor of change in the percent of transfer
students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) for institutions implementing a tuition reset.
However, significant predicts are increased spending in advertising and promotion
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT), changes to net assets
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), and population density within 100 miles of
the campus (X100Density). For each 1% increase in advertising and promotion spending
in the year prior to a reset (AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) the percent change in
transfer student enrollment (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) increases by .4%. For each 1%
increase in net assets (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) the percent change in
transfer students enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase 1.4632%. More
populous regions better position institutions to see an increase in the number of transfer
students enrolled. For each person increase in population density calculated within the
region 100 miles of campus (X100Density) the percent change in transfer students
enrolled (XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT) will increase by 0.0006578%. Given the introduction
of advertising and promotion spending, the variable percent Pell-eligible students is no
longer a statistically significant predictor.
The model’s p-value is 0.0002, which is significant even at the 1% level. The
model explains 52.49% of the variance in the percent change in transfer students
enrolled, a substantive improvement over the first model.
Based on these models, there is no evidence that Sticker Price Elasticity as
measured in the years preceding a tuition reset would be a statistically significant
predictor of transfer student enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset.
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However, consistent with the literature, the more vital an institution is (as measured by a
positive change in net assets), the greater the population density within 100 miles, and the
greater the percentage increase in advertising and promotion, the more transfer student
enrollment would be expected to increase.
Additional Findings
The dataset compiled for this study also allows for preliminary analysis of other
important questions academics and practitioners frequently ask about the effects of tuition
resets. In this section we will examine questions pertaining to the size of a tuition reset,
effects of a tuition reset on retention, and the effectiveness of tuition resets preceding and
following the Great Recession.
Amount of reset
For many institutions considering a tuition reset, a natural assumption is larger
tuition reset amounts will attract a greater number of enrolled students. The tuition reset
amount should be sufficiently large to capture the attention of new populations of
prospective students (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017). However,
Table 21 presents no evidence of a direct correlation between the tuition reset amount
expressed in dollars and common tuition reset outcomes such as changes in first-year
students enrolled, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year enrolled, and the number of
transfer students enrolled. For each outcome, the correlations are not significant at 10%
for the p-value.
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Table 21
Correlation of sticker price change and reset outcomes
Outcome Variable
N
t-value

Degrees
of
Freedom

Pearson's
productmoment
correlation
0.03
0.13
0.06

p-value

Enrolled Change
68
0.25
67
Enrolled Change by Percent
69
1.12
68
Net first-year Tuition and Fee
56
0.44
55
Revenue Change
Net first-year Tuition and Fee
56
-0.80
55
-0.11
Revenue Change by Percent
Transfer Enrolled Change
60
-0.83
59
-0.11
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent
60
0.78
59
0.10
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

0.81
0.27
0.66
0.43
0.41
0.44

The lack of correlation between sticker price and outcomes is also found when the
reset amount is considered on a percentage basis, as shown in Table 22:
Table 22
Correlation of sticker price change by percent and reset outcomes
Outcome Variable
N
t-value Degrees
of
Freedom

Pearson's
productmoment
correlation
0.09
0.11
0.10

pvalue

Enrolled Change
68
0.75
67
Enrolled Change by Percent
69
0.95
68
Net first-year Tuition and Fee
56
0.78
55
Revenue Change
Net first-year Tuition and Fee
56
-1.19
55
-0.16
Revenue Change by Percent
Transfer Enrolled Change
60
0.12
59
0.02
Transfer Enrolled Change by Percent
60
0.14
59
0.02
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

0.46
0.35
0.44
0.24
0.91
0.89

However, simple correlations that assume linear relationships do not capture nonlinear threshold effects. Another way to look at the relationship between sticker price
reductions and the likelihood of success is to examine if resets which are larger are
successful—as defined by an enrollment increase of 5% or more prior to the year
preceding the new lower sticker price—more frequently. Table 24 shows the number of
institutions at varied increasing levels of sticker price reset amount. If there is a threshold
effect, we would expect to see a low success percentage until we hit a certain size, and
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then the percentage success would increase and continue to increase (as we have
exceeded the threshold level).
Unfortunately, no such effect is present in the current data set. In fact, there is no
discernible pattern of enrollment success percent rates as the size of the reset increases;
and if anything the cumulative percent success rate seems to decrease (From 63% success
at resets up to $2,000 to 47% when all resets up to $17,999) as larger and larger reset
amounts are considered as shown by Table 23:
Table 23
Cumulative tuition reset enrollment success rates by reset amount
Reset Amount
Number Enrollment Enrollment Cumulative Cumulative
of
Success
Success
Count
Success
Resets
Percent
Up to $2,000
16
10
63%
16
10
$2,000 to $3,999
19
7
37%
35
17
$4,000 to $5,999
18
9
50%
53
26
$6,000 to $7,999
4
0
0%
57
26
$8,000 to $9,999
7
5
71%
64
31
$10,000 to $11,999
2
1
50%
66
32
$12,000 to $13,999
4
0
0%
70
32
$14,000 to $15,999
1
1
100%
71
33
$16,000 to $17,999
1
1
100%
72
34
Note: Enrollment success is a 5% increase in first-year students over the year prior.

Cumulative
Percent
Success
63%
49%
49%
46%
48%
48%
46%
46%
47%
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Given the lack of a threshold effect in terms of enrollment, it is unsurprising no threshold
effects are observable when looking at net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students
as seen in Table 24:
Table 24
Cumulative tuition reset FY net tuition and fee revenue success rates by reset amount
Reset Amount
Number Enrollment FY Net Cumulative Cumulative
of Resets
Success
Revenue
Count
Success
Success
Percent

Cumulative
FY Net
Revenue
Success
Percent
Success
Up to $2,000
16
8
50%
16
8
50%
$2,000 to $3,999
19
2
11%
35
10
29%
$4,000 to $5,999
18
5
28%
53
15
28%
$6,000 to $7,999
4
0
0%
57
15
26%
$8,000 to $9,999
7
4
57%
64
19
30%
$10,000 to $11,999
2
0
0%
66
19
29%
$12,000 to $13,999
4
1
25%
70
20
29%
$14,000 to $15,999
1
1
100%
71
21
30%
$16,000 to $17,999
1
1
100%
72
22
31%
Note: FY net tuition and fee revenue success is a 5% or greater increase over the year prior.

With the current sample of 72 private not-for-profit institutions which have
implemented a tuition reset, observations based on frequency distributions of tuition reset
success rates do not lend support to a direct relationship between the size of the sticker
price reduction and the likelihood of success; either through correlation analysis nor
through observations of success percentages at different sizes of a tuition reset.
Retention
While most institutions cite recruitment and financial objectives as motivation to
implement a tuition reset, effects on current student enrollment must also be considered
(Casamento, 2016). Increasing retention of first-year students is a way to recuperate lost
revenue from reduced per-student payments of full-pay and near full-pay continuing
students. While IPEDS data do not allow direct analysis of tuition and fee revenues
specific to continuing students, changes in first-year retention rates can be modeled from
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information in this dataset. Of the 72 institutions in this study’s sample, 60 had valid
retention data. The median change to retention was +2 percentage points and average
change was +5 percentage points.
Variable inflation factors (VIF) calculated on independent variables protect from
overfitting due to collinearity. Only variables with VIF less than 4 are used in the model
(Grigsby, 2018). To predict a percentage point change in retention, a multivariate OLS
regression model is developed adding variables without consideration of advertising in a
stepwise fashion as follows:
y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + ε
where,
y is the change in fall-to-fall first-year student’s retention (Retention_CHG) between
the year prior to the reset and the first-year of the reset.
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X3 is the sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a percentage
of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger negative
coefficients.

Sticker Price Elasticity as Predictor of Tuition Reset Success

102

The first OLS linear regression model for changes in retention, without
consideration of advertising and promotion variables, runs on a sample of 48
institutions with valid data. Table 25 shows the results:
Table 25
Linear regression analysis of percent change in first-year student retention without
considering advertising variables
β
Std. Error
T value
p-value
VIF
PED_Sticker
0.1179
0.0866
1.3610
0.1804
1.0954
Change_in_Net_Assets_
18.0865
6.6087
2.7370
0.0089***
1.0057
Ratio_YearPrior
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
-29.2041
14.5477
-2.0070
0.0509*
1.0903
N
48
F Statistic
4.157 (3,44)
Adjusted R2
0.1677
p-value
0.0112
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of first-year
students can be used to predict changes in first-year student retention (Retention_CHG).
That said changes in net assets (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) and the
percent of sticker price change (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) are found to be statistically
significant predictors of changes in first-year student retention. For each 1% increase in
net assets during the year prior to a tuition reset first-year student retention increases by
18.0865%. For each 1% decrease in the sticker price, the first-year student retention rate
will increase 29.2041%.
The model’s p-value is 0.0112, which is significant at the 5% level. The model
explains only 16.77% of the variance of the change in first-year student retention. The F
statistic is 4.157.
To predict a percentage point change in retention, a second multivariate OLS
regression model is developed with consideration of advertising in a stepwise fashion as
follows:
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y = α + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + ε
where,
y is the change in fall-to-fall first-year student’s retention (Retention_CHG) between
the year prior to the reset and the first-year of the reset.
α is the constant.
X1 is sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) of a college’s recruitment population in
the years prior to a tuition reset. Sticker price elasticity is measured as the percent
change of first-year student enrollment given a 1% increase in the sticker price.
X2 is advertising and promotion change by percent
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT) represents a percentage change in spending on
the advertising and promotion lines of an institution’s Form 990 reporting which
compares Year -1 to Year 0. A positive number represents increased advertising and
promotion expenditures.
X3 is the percent change in net assets established during the year prior to a tuition
reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), e.g. the change from Year -2 to Year
-1 net assets include unrestricted, temporarily restricted, and restricted assets. A
positive number indicates a growth in net assets.
X4 is the sticker price reduction (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT) expressed as a percentage
of the sticker price in year -1. Larger reductions are expressed as larger negative
coefficients.
The second OLS linear regression model for changes in retention with
advertising and promotion variables runs on a sample of 31 institutions with valid
data. Table 26 presents the results:
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Table 26
Linear regression analysis of change in first-year student retention considering advertising
β
Std. Error T value
p-value
VIF
PED_Sticker
0.4862
0.3188
1.5250
0.1393
1.2887
Change_in_Net_Assets
38.5055
9.4326
4.0820
0.0004*** 1.1356
_Ratio_YearPrior
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
3.8749
2.4496
1.5820
0.1258**
1.2261
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
-29.7761 15.6196
-1.9060
0.0677*
1.0410
N
31
F Statistic
6.234 (4,26)
Adjusted R2
0.4110 p-value
0.0012
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

No evidence is found that sticker price elasticity (PED_Sticker) is a significant
predictor of change in first-year student fall-to-fall retention (Retention_CHG), but
interestingly neither is advertising and promotion spending
(AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT). Like the previous model changes in net assets
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior ) and the percent of the sticker price change
(StickerPrice_CHG_PCT ) are significant predictors of change in first-year student fall-tofall retention (Retention_CHG). For each percent increase in net assets during the year
prior to a tuition reset (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior), the percent change in
retention (Retention_CHG) increases 38.5055%. For each percent decrease in sticker
price (StickerPrice_CHG_PCT), the percent change in retention will increase by 29.7761%
(Retention_CHG).
The model’s p-value is 0.0112, which is significant at the 5% level. The model
explains 41.10% of the variance of the change in first-year student retention, a
substantive improvement over the prior model. The F statistic is 6.234, higher than the
previous model.
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The Great Recession and Tuition Resets
In prior models, the year of reset was a predictor of the likelihood of increased net
tuition and fee revenue from first-year students (R2) and had a statistically significant
influence on the change in percent Pell-eligible students (R5). The number of tuition
resets per year increased significantly following 2010. This time period corresponds to
the end of the Great Recession (Clark, 2010; Grawe, 2018) but also renewed concerns
surrounding student debt (Baum, 2016). It is natural to ask if tuition resets prior to 2010
have been more successful than those preceding 2010. Table 27 compares the success
rates of tuition resets preceding and following 2010:
Table 27
Tuition reset success preceding and following 2010
Resets 2002 to 2010 Resets 2011 to 2017
Count
14
58
Enrollment Success (1)
7
27
Enrollment Success Percent
50.0%
46.6%
Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success (2)
5
17
Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success Percent
35.7%
29.3%
Note: (1) Enrollment success is 5% or greater increase of first-year students in first-year of
reset price
(2) Net Tuition and Fee Revenue Success is 5% or greater increase in net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students in the first year of the reset price.

Prior to 2010, 7 of 14 resets (50%) resulted in a 5% or greater increase in
enrollment and 5 of 14 (or 36%) resulted in a 5% increase in net tuition and fee revenue
from first-year students. Following 2010, 58 institutions implemented a tuition reset with
27 increasing enrollments by 5% or more (46.6%) and 17 (or 29%) increased net tuition
and fee revenue from first-year students. Despite the increased frequency of tuition resets
after 2010, success rates are slightly lower. However, these differences are not
statistically significant when analyzed with Welch Independent Samples T-Tests:
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Table 28
Tuition reset success preceding and following 2010, Independent samples t-test
Enrollment Success
Net Tuition and
Fee Success
t-value
-0.35
0.01
Degrees of Freedom
17.65
19.23
p-value
0.73
0.99
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

The evidence then is that there is no statistically significant difference in success
rates prior to or following 2010.
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Chapter 5 - Discussion
Chapter 5 contextualizes findings from Chapter 4 to the research purpose and
goals. The chapter begins with a summary of the study including research purpose,
problem, and specific research questions. The chapter then outlines major findings and
applies these to discussions of theory and the profession. The chapter then documents the
limitations of the study and provides suggestions for further research. The chapter ends
with concluding thoughts.
Summary of the Study
The traditional high price and high discount model which has dominated higher
education more and more is coming to be considered unsustainable (Lederman & Seltzer,
2017; Pryor, 2017). In response, an increasing number of institutions are considering
implementing tuition resets (Kantrowitz, 2019) wherein the published sticker price is
reduced, but also accompanied by a roughly commensurate reduction in financial aid.
The net price students pay remains essentially the same (Bernard, 2019). However,
results to date have been mixed (Bloom, 2017; Seltzer, 2017a).
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between measures of
sticker price elasticity and the change in first-year student enrollment, net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students, first-year students who are Pell-eligible, and transfer
students enrolled following a tuition reset using multivariate logistic and linear regression
models.
The main independent variable of interest is sticker price sensitivity as measured
by the sticker price elasticity of demand (Bradley & Singell Jr., 2010; Farhan, 2016) in
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the two years prior to the announcement of the reset event. The dependent variables
stemming from industry dialog (Bloom, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015) are
increased first-year students enrollment, increase in net tuition and fee revenue from firstyear students, increase in the percentage of Pell-eligible students in the first-year cohort,
increase in transfer students enrollment, likelihood the tuition reset will increase first-year
student enrollment, and likelihood the tuition reset will increase net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students. The effects of increased advertising and promotion
spending was introduced as an intervening variable (S. Bodfish, personal communication,
May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016; Kumar, 2005; Lapovsky, 2015).
The research questions this study looked to address were as follows:
1. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in first-year student enrollment
for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
2. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict the likelihood of an increase in net tuition and fee revenue
from first-year students for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
3. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in first-year student enrollment for institutions
implementing a tuition reset?
4. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in net tuition and fee revenue from first-year
students for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
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5. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in the percent of first-year Pell-eligible student
enrollment for institutions implementing a tuition reset?
6. Does sticker price elasticity in the two years prior to the announcement of a
tuition reset predict an increase in transfer student enrollment for institutions
implementing a tuition reset?
As discussed in the literature review, many practitioners emphasize the role of
advertising in a successful tuition reset. For each of the above research questions, this
study examines the intervening effects of changes in advertising spending and indicators
of financial health.
To explore these questions, a quantitative analysis of 72 private not-for-profit, 4year or above institutions was conducted from a larger list of 142 resets. These
institutions implemented tuition resets between the academic years 2003-2004 and 20172018. Data regarding these institutions and their resets was assembled from IPEDS, Form
990 data, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Of these 72 institutions, advertising and promotion
expenditure information was provided for 43.
Major Findings
The major findings of this study were presented in three parts: a review of
frequency distributions which provide documentation of the types of institutions which
implement tuition resets and catalog the outcomes realized, findings that pertain directly
to the research questions this study sought to address, and additional findings which can
seed future research or be of special interest to industry practitioners.
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Frequency Distributions
A major contribution of this study is to characterize institutions implementing
tuition resets and the breadth of results these institutions have realized. Among the 72
private not-for-profit, 4-year or above institutions analyzed, the average tuition reset
amount was 18% of the sticker price, and the average tuition amount reset expressed in
dollars was $4,967.
The focus of this study is the role of sticker price elasticity as a predictor of
tuition reset success. This study assumes institutions seek to implement tuition resets
because of perceived student sticker-price sensitivity; expressed by a sticker-price
elasticity of -1 or lower. However, at the institution recruitment population level, the
range of sticker price elasticity for first-year students (from -3.37 to 4.07) and transfer
students (from -1.77 to 5.04) of institutions implementing a tuition reset provides
evidence of a wide range of behavioral responses to sticker price in the years preceding a
tuition reset, including responses reflecting Veblen effects wherein higher prices would
be expected to increase demand.
Many institutions implementing tuition resets reflect low levels of financial
health. According to the analysis of Form 990 data, the interquartile range of FIT scores
for institutions implementing a tuition reset ranged from 0.40 (should perform a thorough
review of institutional effectiveness) to 3.86 (significant changes needed to achieve
mission) (The Austen Group, 2019b) on a scale from -4 to 10.
Institutions implementing tuition resets realized a wide range of outcomes that
underscore both the significant risks and potential rewards. In terms of increased
enrollment of first-year students, the median outcome was 0% and the average was
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+19%. In terms of net revenue from first-year students, the median outcome was a 4%
loss and an average gain of 19%. The median results of other important outcomes were a
1 percentage point increase in the percent of first-year students who are Pell-eligible, 2
percentage point increase in first-year student retention, and a 6% increase in transfer
students enrolled. Institutions looking to implement a tuition reset should be clear on their
goals and the results they would like to achieve.
Institutions implementing tuition resets assume significant levels of risk. Among
the 72 institutions that implemented a tuition reset the 25 th percentile (which represents
the outcome of 1 in 4 institutions that implement a tuition reset) outcomes indicate a
decline in applications of 7% or more, yield on admitted students declined by 4% or
more, discount rates increases by 3% or more (indicating a reduction of both sticker price
and net price), enrollment of first-year students declines by 12% or more, and net revenue
from first-year students decreases by 26% or more. No one institution realized all these
negative effects, but if any particular institution realizes one or more of these effects, it
could be difficult to recover. Institutions planning to implement a tuition reset should
carefully consider their risk threshold and options to mitigate potential negative
consequences.
Research questions
The six research questions, as well as an additional finding pertaining to retention,
focus on the role of sticker price elasticity as a statistically significant predictor of various
dimensions of success for institutions implementing a tuition reset. Table 29 summarizes
the findings after examining models that both exclude and include the advertising and
promotion spending variables.
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Table 29
Summary of Findings

R1 R1A R2 R2A R3 R3A R4 R4A R5 R5A R6 R6A AF2(1) AF2A(1)
PED_Sticker
x
S
x
x
x
x
x
x
S
x
x
x
PED_Sticker_XFR
x
x
Reset_Success_Enrollment
DV DV
Reset_Success_NetRevenue
DV DV
Enrolled_CHG_PCT
DV DV
Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT
DV DV
PercentPell_CHG
DV
DV
XFR_Enroll_CHG_PCT
DV DV
Retention_CHG
DV
DV
PercentPell_YearPrior
s
x
x
x
S
S
S
x
ViabilityRatio_YearPrior
S
x
Enrolled_Trend
S
200Density
x
S
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT
S
S
S
S
S
x
App_Trend
x
S
x
x
S
x
StickerPrice_YearPrior
x
x
S
DiscountRate_Prior
x
Year_of_Reset
S
x
S
200Population
x
Equity_Ratio_YearPrior
x
Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior
S
S
StickerPrice_CHG
x
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT
S
S
S
S
AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior
S
100Density
S
S
Evidence
No Yes No No No No No No Yes No No No
No
No
Note: Evidence is Yes if there is a statistically significant relationship between sticker price elasticity (the primary independent variable of
interest) and the dependent variable at .1% level or lower. Underlined variables are dependent variables. 'x' indicates use of variable in the
model but no statistically significant relationship. S indicates a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and
dependent variable. (1) Results from additional findings quest 2 relates to predicting retetion (OLS Linear regression).
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In short, sticker price elasticity in the years preceding a tuition reset is a weak
predictor of success for institutions looking to implement a tuition reset. Sticker price
elasticity was a significant predictor of tuition reset success only when the change in
advertising and promotion spending was considered (R1A). Sticker price elasticity was
also a significant predictor of a percent Pell increase when advertising was not
considered. For all other research questions, sticker price elasticity was not a significant
factor in explaining the likelihood of success or other levels of the examined outcome
variables.
From this study, however, we found the percent change in advertising and
promotion spending is positively associated with many important tuition reset outcomes:
the likelihood of increased enrollment, the likelihood of increasing net tuition and fee
revenue from first-year students, the percent change in enrollment, the percent change in
net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, and change in first-year student
retention rate. For all research questions, the addition of advertising and promotion
variables strengthened the explanatory power of models. These findings confirm evidence
from earlier qualitative studies that institutions need to invest in promoting reasons for
the tuition reset and how it benefits students.
Similarly, we found evidence that the change in net assets ratio was positively
associated with increases in enrollment, increases in net tuition and fee revenue, and
increases in first-year student retention. Such evidence is consistent with findings from
qualitative studies that institutions implementing tuition resets should do so from a
position of growing financial vitality, rather than as an effort to reverse financial decline.
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Other Findings
Institutions implementing a tuition reset often ask about the right amount of a
tuition reset with the expectation a larger tuition reset will attract more attention than a
smaller one. This study found no correlation between the size of a tuition reset (in either
absolute dollar terms or as a percentage of the sticker price) and outcomes in terms of
enrollment or net tuition and fees from first-year students. This study also found no
evidence of a “threshold amount” (in either absolute dollar terms or as a percentage of the
sticker price) wherein outcomes in terms of enrollment or net tuition and fees from firstyear students changed significantly after a certain amount was cut. These findings are
contrary to those beliefs held by intuitions that resets need to be of a certain size to attract
attention and underscore the need for advertising.
Many institutions implementing a tuition reset experienced an increase in
retention. Models to predict this increase in first-year student retention show the
statistically significant influence of Change in Net Assets Ratio and percent change in
advertising and promotion spending change. The influence of sticker price elasticity was
not significant.
Despite a notable increase in the number of tuition resets attempted annually
FY2011 and following, no statistically significant difference was found between the
success rates of tuition resets prior to or following 2010 when assessing a 5% or greater
increase in first-year student enrollment or increase of net tuition and fee revenue from
first-year students.
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Implications for Theory
The study of tuition resets is an emerging field. Building upon previous
qualitative and quantitative studies, this is the most comprehensive study to date of
tuition resets by the number of tuition resets considered and breath of data elements
incorporated into the analysis. This study investigates a list of 142 institutions that
implemented the tuition reset strategy between the 1996-1997 academic year and 20202021. Further, this study supplies a deeper analysis of 72 4-year, not-for-profit institutions
that implemented a reset between the 2003-2004 and 2017-2018 academic years for
which more extensive data is available. From these 72 institutions, 43 provided
advertising and promotion spending information on Form 990s. Kottich’s (2017)
quantitative examination of tuition resets, the largest previous quantitative study,
examined results from 45 private not-for-profit 4-year institutions.
Similar to Kottich’s (2017) use of IPEDS and Form 990 data to analyze the results
of a tuition reset, this study added U.S. Census Bureau data to consider factors of
population and population density. This study also included the use of advertising and
promotion spending from Form 990s. Future researchers can review the tuition reset lists
compiled in this study and add analysis of further resets as publicly available data sets are
extended with annual updates.
This study extends literature about the effects of price as a quality signal in higher
education. Tuition resets offer a natural experiment by which researchers can contrast the
influence of sticker price and net price on a purchase decision. This study found no direct
relationship between change in sticker price and the enrollment or net tuition and fee
revenues realized in the first year of the reset. However, sticker price change by percent
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was a significant predictor of the proportion of first-year students who are Pell-eligible
(without considering advertising and promotion spending) and increases in first-year
student retention rates. These findings suggest the direct influence of sticker price may be
greater on low-income families.
The findings of this study underscore the central role of advertising and
promotion investment in the tuition reset process. Increased spending in advertising and
promotions in the year prior to the tuition reset was positively associated with many
important outcomes as shown in Chapter 4. However, the size of the sticker price
reduction and price sensitivity of prospective students have weaker or no effects. On this
basis, the tuition reset announcement should be seen as a marketing opportunity to both
build brand awareness (Bodfish, 2017) and change the price position of the institution
relative to known competitors (Shirai, 2015). Changing sticker price alone has little
effect, changing the price in conjunction with a clear and compelling explanation for an
unexpected price reduction does (Dolan & Simon, 1996; Shirai, 2015). Advertising and
promotion investment also allows the resetting institution to explain the rationale behind
a tuition reset, reconcile any dissonance of a lower price position with expectations for
high quality, reconcile messages of affordability with a strategy that moves towards price
transparency, and frames the competitive set to which an institution should continue to be
compared.
Implications for the Profession
Tuition resets involve significant risk and are far from a quick fix to difficult
recruitment trends faced by many institutions. The distribution frequencies section of this
study demonstrates that many institutions implementing tuition resets have experienced
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negative outcomes including decreases in applications, lower first-year enrollment, and
losses in net tuition and fee revenue. Institutions with weak financial health compound
the severity of these risks as their ability to absorb a negative outcome is less. But many
institutions also realize gains by these same measures. Institutions considering a tuition
reset, then, are well-advised to note the risks involved and consider their capacity to
withstand one or more of these negative outcomes.
Beyond a general description of the outcomes of a tuition reset, enrollment
professionals and consultants would like to know if they should consider implementing a
tuition reset at a specific institution. Models developed in this study are not sufficiently
predictive to make a determinative recommendation if an institution should go ahead with
a reset, but they do show factors that can help institutions rule out the implementation of
the strategy.
First, this study found institutions implementing tuition resets often have students
that do not exhibit sticker price-sensitive behavior at the population level. Institutions
need to have a detailed understanding of how their specific students will respond to
changes in sticker price prior to implementing a tuition reset. This finding highlights the
need for student-level price sensitivity analysis in the years preceding a tuition reset.
Such market research quantifies the independent influence of cost of attendance (at reset,
normal or higher levels) and financial aid has on the decision of sub-populations to enroll
at a specific institution (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Carter &
Curry, 2011; Casamento, 2016).
Second, this study found that a change in net assets in the year prior
(Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior) to a reset is one of the most consistent
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independent variables (R3, R4, R6, Retention) associated with levels of enrollment and
net tuition and fee revenue increase. Tuition resets help institutions with growing net
assets. Institutions with a lower or negative change in net asset ratios may see unexpected
negative outcomes. Consistent with earlier qualitative studies, institutions should be
financially healthy before the implementation of a tuition reset (Casamento, 2016;
Kottich, 2017; Lawlor, 2016).
Third, this study found a positive correlation between changes in advertising
spending and some important tuition reset outcome measures such as an increase in firstyear student enrollment, an increase in net tuition and fee revenue, and an increase in
transfer student enrollment. Institutions considering a tuition reset need to prepare to
make a significant investment in marketing and advertising to promote the reset.
Institutions that fail to make a substantive investment in advertising and promotion not
only secure a financial loss from full-pay continuing students but also risk neglecting
opportunities to benefit from the price reduction. Prospective students and parents who
no longer consider an institution based on sticker price need to be told they should take
another look because of news of the reset. Students and parents already considering the
reset need to be told the rationale for the reset lest they perceive quality will suffer as a
result.
Limitations
Known limitations constrain this research:
First, IPEDS has known lags in reporting, as mentioned previously. If an
institution takes its fall enrollment census in October of year 0, it will not be publicly
visible in IPEDS until 15-24 months later. This lag was a major reason why this study is
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limited to 72 private not-for-profit institutions with sufficient IPEDS data available. This
is the largest sample size of existing academic studies of tuition resets known by the
author.
Second, statistically, only a small number of institutions perform tuition resets
each year. While the event-study methodology allowed us to investigate the effects of a
tuition reset based on the full sample size, the results depend upon the proper controlling
for the influence of outliers. The small sample size prohibited splitting the sample data
file to test for overfitting in the logistic regression models. The available sample size for
future studies will increase as the number of institutions implementing tuition resets in
the future increases. With larger sample sizes, the statistical robustness and reliability of
quantitative methods available increases.
Third, little has been written from an academic perspective on the phenomenon of
tuition resets. Because of this gap in documented literature, greater reliance upon
theoretical concepts and analogy from other industries were used to interpret observed
trends in higher education, which leaves some potential for error.
Fourth, the sample for this study was only institutions that implemented a tuition
reset. Future studies can name a parallel peer group by criteria under investigation (e.g.
institution size by enrollment, operating budget, institutional control) and attribute
changes to the tuition reset compared to other factors affecting the private not-for-profit
sector.
Fifth, the study focuses on the outcomes from first-year students. Full break-even
analysis of a tuition reset should consider the financial impact from transfer and
continuing students as well. Secondary data sources such as IPEDS and Form 990s does
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not provide data suitable for analyzing these issues. Institutions report tuition, fees, room
and board at the institutional level, without separation between continuing, first-year, and
transfer students. Rather than analyzing data at the institutional level, data would need to
be collected at the student level for each institution.
The findings of this study are generalizable only to private 4-year not-for-profit
institutions. Public institutions may reset for different reasons than private institutions
(e.g. under mandates from governing bodies, compliance with state funding mandates)
and have different goals as a result. Tuition resets for specific academic degrees and
programs are not within the scope of this study and face different communications
challenges.
Recommendations for Further Research
More and more institutions announce tuition resets each year. However, evidence
from this study supports the previous findings that tuition resets involve significant risks.
Further research will help institutions improve their understanding of risks involved and
outline criteria wherein implementation of a tuition reset will increase the enrollment of
first-year students, transfer students, and improve both retention and net tuition and fee
revenue.
Tuition resets are still a recent phenomenon and require further study. The
direction of such research can include profiling institutions considering a reset (e.g.
predicting which institutions will implement a reset), identifying factors that predict
successful tuition resets, and describing how tuition resets impact aspects of an
institution's profile and/or segments of students).
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Studies that predict which institutions will implement a tuition reset could look
more closely at the institutional size (enrollment and annual operating budget) and quality
of student body (selectivity, average test scores) which are often cited reference points of
college presidents and enrollment management professionals. This study documented
wide variations by BEA Statistical region in the number of tuition resets implemented but
did not attempt to explain this variance. Future studies could look at regional variances
and seek to explain why the tuition reset strategy is more attractive in some regions (e.g.
number of colleges, the income of families in the region, demographic trends, type of
dominant competitors).
Future studies about tuition resets should identify and characterize drivers for
successful tuition reset outcomes. Factors that lead an institution to consider a tuition
reset may or may not also lead to the successful execution of that strategy. Future studies
then can also test institution size (e.g. by enrollment or annual tuition revenue) and the
academic profile of students (e.g. through test scores) as factors that portend successful
outcomes.
This study found no evidence of a direct relationship between the size of the
tuition reset and increase in enrollment despite the expectation that a larger tuition reset
amount would attract more attention than a smaller amount. Future research should
explore why evidence to date runs contrary to this expectation. Future research should
focus on the relationship between tuition reset reduction amount, level of advertising
given inquiry pool size, and efficacy of different tuition reset messages (e.g. affordability
emphasis or transparency emphasis). This final point bears more explanation.
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Because tuition resets create a meaning paradox (lower sticker price, higher
quality, but the same net price), the burden falls on the institution to explain the rationale
for the tuition reset. Future studies can test specific messaging themes (e.g. affordability,
value, transparency, revitalized brand, association with capital campaigns) coded from
tuition reset announcements for correlation with positive tuition reset outcomes.
Future studies should also describe how tuition resets impact aspects of an
institution's profile and/or segments of students). The impact of tuition resets on
continuing students continues to be an under-discussed consideration. This study,
consistent with Kottich (2017) finds institutions that conducted a tuition reset
experienced an increase in retention. A multiple case-study approach that considers both
financial and attitudinal information could shed important light on how institutions
performing tuition resets can make plans to ensure current students are retained and can
assist in future recruitment efforts. Researchers do not yet understand the impact of
tuition resets on other factors such as student satisfaction and graduation rates. More
research will clarify how tuition resets impact recognized drivers of retention, especially
when financial aid packages for continuing students are frequently reduced in dollar
amount.
Tuition resets are also frequently proposed as a strategy to attract lower-income
students (Davis, 2003; Rine, 2016). This study shows that the percent of Pell-eligible
students in a first-year cohort on average increased by 1% at the median and average.
This study also found the change in Pell-eligible student enrollments is associated with
the size of the sticker price change, the number of Pell-eligible students already in the
first-year cohort, and the year of the reset. Future studies can look at whether changes in
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the percent Pell-eligible students continues to increase in the years following a reset, and
whether Pell-eligible students pay less following a reset.
Finally, this study primarily sought to understand the major effects of a tuition
reset in the first year of the reset. A major conversation in the industry relates to whether
the benefits of a tuition reset persist beyond the first-year. Future studies can compare the
results from the first-year with outcomes in later years.
Conclusions and Final Thoughts
At a time when researchers and practitioners are questioning the dominant model
of higher education pricing—tuition discounting—an increasing number of institutions
are considering the tuition reset strategy. Proponents of the tuition reset point to
advantages in terms of perceived affordability, price transparency, and college access.
Critics impugn it as an ineffective and deceptive marketing tactic as net price stays about
the same. This study has shown evidence that the tuition reset strategy is risky, but some
institutions have successfully implemented it. Whether an institution opts to reset or
continue to discount tuition at a high-price and high discount level, the pricing strategy
needs to accurately communicate the institution’s quality to prospective students.
Colleges often reference concerns of prospective students about high published
prices for higher education as a primary reason to implement a tuition reset. A rational
and compassionate response to such concern about prices is to reduce the published price
and show commitment to affordability and transparency in pricing. However, this study
found sticker price sensitivity as measured by sticker price elasticity has no significant
effect on the tuition reset outcomes. Of the 12 models developed in response to the six
research questions, sticker price elasticity was only a statistically significant predictor for
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the likelihood of success of enrollment increase when used in conjunction with increase
in advertising spending. Sticker price elasticity was also a predictor for the increase in the
proportion of first-year Pell recipients in a first-year class when not considering changes
in advertising spending.
Additionally, the tuition reset amount itself seems to be of lesser importance.
Sticker price change (in dollars) was not a significant predictor for most outcomes. The
sticker price change by percent variable was significant only in predicting a change in the
proportion of Pell-eligible students following the reset (the larger the reduction, the
greater the percentage increase in the proportion of Pell-eligible students). Although
limited by small samples at higher tuition reset amounts, examination of success rates did
not suggest the existence of threshold sizes of reduction amounts to increase the chances
of successfully implementing a tuition reset.
While sticker price elasticity and the amount of tuition reduction were not
significant predictors for tuition reset success, change promotion and advertising
expenditures as reported on Form 990s was. A percentage increase in advertising
spending was a significant factor in determining the likelihood of enrollment success, the
likelihood of increased net revenue from first-year students, change in first-year student
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, the proportion of Pelleligible first-year students and first-year student retention. These results underscore the
need to invest in an overarching brand strategy and communications plan which explains
the rationale behind and benefits of a tuition reset which had been emphasized in
qualitative studies (Casamento, 2016; Lapovsky, 2015) and practitioners consulting in
this area (S. Bodfish, personal communication, May 23, 2017; Lawlor, 2016).
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Consistent with previous qualitative studies (S. Bodfish, personal communication,
May 23, 2017; Casamento, 2016), tuition resets are more likely to have successful
outcomes when the institution is thriving. Increases in net assets in the year leading into
the announcement of a tuition reset is associated with increases in first-year student
enrollment, net tuition and fee revenue from first-year students, transfer student
enrollment, and first-year student retention. On this basis, tuition resets should be seen as
a component in a wider brand repositioning strategy, not as a pricing tactic to reverse the
decline. The pricing strategy needs to accurately communicate the benefits of an
institution in terms that prospective students value.
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Appendix A
Following is a listing of institutions considered in the preparation of this study, including information regarding institutional context and information sources to document the tuition reset. The final column indicates if there is
enough data available to include each institution in one or more substantial components of analysis outlined in this proposal. Following the table of institutions, a list of website links is provided which document online lists of
tuition resets and announcements of specific tuition resets for institutions listed.
Table A1
List of institutions implementing a tuition
reset
Institution Name

First Year of
New Tuition

Waldorf College (IA) (Now Waldorf
University)
Muskingum College (OH)
North Carolina Wesleyan College (NC)
Bluefield College
Pine Manor College (MA)
Sheldon Jackson College (AK)
Thiel College (PA)
College of William & Mary (Richard Bland
College of William and Mary) (VA)
Marlboro College (VT)
University of Virginia (VA)
Wells College (NY)
Bethany College (WV)
Heidelberg University
Waldorf College (University)

1987-1988

Abilene Christian University (TX)
The College of Idaho (Albertson College)
Westminster College (MO)
Eureka College (IL)
Lourdes University
Salem International University

2003-2004
2003-2004
2003-2004
2004-2005
2004-2005
2004-2005

North Park University (IL)
Roosevelt University
Amridge University

2005-2006
2005-2006
2006-2007

1996-1997
1996-1997
1998-1999
1998-1999
1998-1999
1998-1999
1999-2000
1999-2000
1999-2000
1999-2000
2002-2003
2002-2003
2003-2002

Sector
Private for-profit,
4-year or above
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public, 2-year
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private for-profit,
4-year or above
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private for-profit,
4-year or above
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

Notes

Closed in 2007

Heidelberg College to Heidelberg University (2009)
1 program

Name change to Regions University from Southern
Christian University in 2006; then name change to
Amridge University in 2008

Cappex NAICU Edvisors Kottich
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

Web IPEDS Use in
Search Data analysis

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
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South Dakota Colleges (SD)
Blackburn College (IL)
North Park University
Warner Pacific College
Davis & Elkins College
Penn Foster College
William Jessup University
Baptist Bible College (MO)
Rabbinical College of Telshe (OH)
Waldorf College (University)

2006-2007
2008-2009
2008-2009
2008-2009
2009-2010
2009-2010
2009-2010
2010-2011
2010-2011
2010-2011

Beis Medrash Heichal Dovid (Far Rockaway,
NY):
Bluefield College (VA)
Brewton-Parker College (GA)
Davis College
John Wesley University (NC)
Sewanee-The University of the South (TN)
Urbana University (Urbana, OH):
Burlington College
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Out-of-state only

2011-2012

Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private for-profit,
4-year or above
Private not-for-profit

2011-2012
2011-2012
2011-2012
2011-2012
2011-2012
2011-2012
2012-2013

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

25% for working adults

Cabrini College (PA)
Cleary University (MI)
Duquesne University (PA)
Jarvis Christian College
Lincoln College
Montreat College
Our Lady of Holy Cross College (University
of Holy Cross)
Patten University
Regent University
Seton Hall University
University of Charleston
William Peace University
Alfred University (NY)
Allen University
Ancilla College

2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2012-2013
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014

Belmont Abbey College
Central Christian College of Kansas
City University of Seattle
Concordia University-Saint Paul
Cox College
Harrison College
Hiwassee College
Life Pacific College

2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit,
2-year
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

X
X

X
X

Y

X

X
X

Y
1% reduction
Online, 28%

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

Y
7% cut

X
X

13.8% reduction

X
X
X

50 percent for online intersession courses
Summer 2012 - 25 percent discount for summer
semester
Name change to Cabrini University in 2016
School of education only

Formerly Oakland Bible Institute
20% of undergraduate online
$21,000 for high achieving students
22% for freshman and transfer students

X

Y

X

X

X
X
X

Y
Y

X
X

Y

X

X
X
X
X

Y
Y

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Y
Y

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Y
Y

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

(IN, OH, NC, Online) (9 programs)
more than

X

X

X

Y

X

X

X

Y

X

X
X

Y

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
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Life University
Manhattanville College
Martin University
Mid-Continent University
Saint Louis Christian College
Alaska Pacific University
Ashland University (OH)
Ave Maria University (FL)
Bethune-Cookman University (FL)
Converse College
Friends University
Lesley University
National Louis University
Ohio Northern University
Pacific States University
Piedmont International University (NC)
Prescott College
Seton Hall University
Southern Virginia University
St Vincent's College
Wilson College
York College of Pennsylvania
Boston Baptist College (MA)
College of Mount Saint Vincent
Everest University (FL, MO)

2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2013-2014
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2014-2015
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private, not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

Grace College and Theological Seminary
Holy Apostles College and Seminary (CT)
Lewis and Clark State College
Lincoln Christian University
National Louis University
Northwood University-Texas
Paul Quinn College
St. Vincent’s College (CT)
Stephen F. Austin State University (TX)
Stillman College
University of North Texas (TX)
Wilberforce University (OH)
Wilmington College
Burlington College (VT)
Central Washington University
Eastern Washington University
Evergreen State College
Iowa Wesleyan University (IA)
Lewis and Clark State College

2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for--profit
Public
Public
Public
Private not-for-profit
Public

X
X
2014 - Bankruptcy
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

X
X
X

Y

X

Y
Y

X

Actually, NOT a reset, it’s a tuition guarantee plan

Winston-Salem, NC
Reduced tuition to $22,500 for freshmen.
reduced tuition by 23 percent

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

Y
Y
Y

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
Followed by 56% increase
Various campuses owned by Zenith Education Group
as of 2015; formerly owned by for-profit Corinthian
Colleges.

X
X
X

Y
Y

Y
Y
After 49% increase in 2014-2015
Followed tuition reduction in 2014-2015
Followed tuition reduction in 2014-2015
OK residents only

X
X
X

Y

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Y
Y
X

X

X
X

Y
Y

X
X
X
Y
X

X

Y

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

9 percent reduction [Closed May 2016]

X

X
X

X
X
X
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Pima Community College (AZ)
Rosemont College
Rutgers University – Camden (NJ)
University of Bridgeport (CT)

2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017

Public, 2-year
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit

University of St. Joeseph (CT)
University of Washington (WA)
Utica College
Washington State University (WA)
Western Washington University (WA)
College of St. Mary (Omaha, NE)
Columbia College (SC)
Immaculata University (PA)
La Salle University (PA)
Marian University (Fond du Lac, WI)
University of Southern Mississippi (MS)
Avila University
Benedict College (SC)
Birmingham-Southern College (AL)
Canisius College, Buffalo, NY
Champlain College Online (VT)

2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2016-2017
2017-2018
2017-2018
2017-2018
2017-2018
2017-2018
2017-2018
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019

Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Public
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

Cleary University
Cleveland Institute of Music (OH)
College of St. Joseph (VT)
Colorado Mountain College
Cornerstone University (MI)
Drew University (NJ)
Eastern Nazarene College
Elizabeth City State University
Glenville State College
Mills College (CA)
Seton Hall University
Sweet Briar College
The Masters University (CA)

2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

University of Detroit Mercy
University of North Carolina, Pembroke
University of Sioux Falls (Sioux Falls, SD)
University of the Sciences (PA)
Warner Pacific University (formerly College)

2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019
2018-2019

Private not-for-profit
Public
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

Western Carolina University
Albright College

2018-2019
2019-2020

Public
Private not-for-profit

Out-of-state and internationals only
Low- and middle- income NJ residents only
(In-State) reduced tuition for in-state students to
$18,500
29 percent reduction in room and board

X
X
X

Y

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Out of state only

X

X
X
X

Y

X

X

Y
Y
Y
Y

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Career-focused adult higher education (Online) 50%
tuition reduction
Public service workers only
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

Announced with affirmation of mission, new majors,
success in athletics, and a new capital campaign.
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
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Capital University

2019-2020

Private not-for-profit

Cornish College of the Arts
Elizabethtown College
Elmira College
Greensboro College
Ontario Province

2019-2020
2019-2020
2019-2020
2019-2020
2019-2020

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Public

St. John's College (NY)
University of Sioux Falls
University of the Cumberlands
Wells College (NY)

2019-2020
2019-2020
2019-2020
2019-2020

Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit
Private not-for-profit

50 percent tuition reduction for incoming
undergraduates whose families have chosen missioncentered careers through nonprofit and public-service
work under the Good Guarantee program

X

X
X
10 per cent tuition rate cut on all publicly assisted
college and universities in Ontario for the 2019-2020
academic year; not applicable to foreign students.
(Santa Fe, NM and Annapolis MD)

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

* Note: More data will be coming available in Fall 2019 for analysis.

The following list of websites document both specific institutional tuition resets, but also lists of institutions that have implemented this strategy. Major sources as reflected in the table above are in bold typeface:


http://belmontabbeycollege.edu/admissions/home-school/explore/tuition-and-fees/tuition-reset/



http://homernews.com/homer-news/business/2013-05-22/alaska-pacific-university-cuts-tuition-by-30-percent



http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/pf/1111/gallery.colleges_lower_tuition/2.html



http://relevantscience.blogspot.com/2012/07/38-colleges-lowering-their-tuition.html



http://www.al.com/news/tuscaloosa/index.ssf/2015/01/stillman_college_reducing_tuit.html



http://www.benedict.edu/cms/?q=node/1481



http://www.capitalgazette.com/news/annapolis/ac-cn-st-johns-college-tuition-0913-story.html



http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2013/08/ashland_university_will_reduce.html



http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/09/cleveland_institute_of_music_t.html



http://www.collegegold.com/applydecide/tuitionfreezelist



http://www.drew.edu/admissions-aid/undergraduate-admissions/tuition-reset/?
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http://www.glenville.edu/news/? p=24959



http://www.grace.edu/newsandevents/? p=8686



http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article176099841.html



http://www.lasalle.edu/tuitionreset/



http://www.masters.edu/news/increase-in-opportunity-through-decrease-in-tuition?utm_source=All+Emails+Active&utm_campaign=71c83d25e1EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_11_13&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3ece201a10-71c83d25e1-181935489



http://www.nj.com/education/2017/09/one_of_njs_costliest_universities_slashes_tuition.html



http://www.omaha.com/news/education/college-of-st-mary-to-cut-sticker-price-by-citing/article_3d926a3c-1efe-5eef-923e-e59867649fd7.html



http://www.poorhandmaids.org/index.php/latest-news/current-events/item/45-ancilla-college-lowers-tuition-costs



http://www.register-herald.com/news/glenville-state-college-lowering-tuition-by-percent/article_2eadc3d0-da0d-11e7-b73e-572a36719380.html



http://www.rosemont.edu/admissions/tuition-and-aid/our-tuition-promise/media-coverage.php



http://www.sentinel-echo.com/kentucky/news/university-of-the-cumberlands-announces-percent-cut-of-tuition/article_a095849d-a240-5e2e-8656-ef19002a57a6.html



http://www.thestate.com/news/local/education/article208435774.html



http://www.utica.edu/uc/affordability-initiative/



http://www7.shu.edu/admissions/public-tuition-rate-program.cfm



https://affordableschools.net/30-colleges-reversing-rise-tuition/



https://chognews.org/2018/01/18/warner-pacific-college-becomes-warner-pacific-university-reduces-tuition/



https://columbiabusinessreport.com/news/education/70895/



https://crosscut.com/2019/01/cornish-college-reduces-tuition-20-percent-increase-enrollment



https://enc.edu/news/eastern-nazarene-college-announces-lower-tuition-rates-for-fall-2018/



https://finance.yahoo.com/news/college-mount-saint-vincent-announces-120000448.html



https://law.onu.edu/promise



https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/28/pf/christian_colleges/index.htm
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https://sacramentopress.com/2009/02/06/bucking-trends-william-jessup-university-announces-decrease-in-tuition-for-2009-2010-academic-year-private-university-also-announces-new-scholarship-program-to-assiststudents/



https://webcpm.com/articles/2018/03/20/benedict-college-tuition.aspx?s=CPMWeeklyUpdate_120418&admgarea=CPMWeeklyUpdate



https://westfaironline.com/78712/university-of-bridgeport-promises-lower-tuition-for-residents/



https://www.artsci.com/news/2017/9/19/la-salle-universitys-tuition-reset-boosts-enrollment-while-skeptics-question-strategy-new-coverage



https://www.ashland.edu/admissions/tuition-reset



https://www.aspentimes.com/news/cmc-cuts-tuition-for-bachelors-degrees-hikes-other-rates/



https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2013/10/lesley-university-cuts-tuition-25.html



https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass_roundup/2014/10/lesley-universitys-slump-highlights-risks-of-new.html



https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/03/31/for-small-private-colleges-fewer-students-means-more-worries/1jjd8ZFusBt3kGjHOcpIqM/story.html



https://www.bsc.edu/lowertuition/faq.html



https://www.canisius.edu/excellence-within-reach



https://www.capital.edu/good-guarantee/



(CAPPEX) https://www.cappex.com/hq/articles-and-advice/college-search/financial-fit/Tuition-Cuts-and-Tuition-Resets



https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ave-maria-university-reduces-tuition-to-ease-burden-on-families



https://www.cbsnews.com/news/to-boost-student-enrollment-colleges-are-cutting-tuition/



https://www.champlain.edu/online/about-us/in-the-news/tuition-reduction-announcement



https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/university-of-detroit-mercy-to-reset-undergraduate-tuition-from-41-158-to-28-000



https://www.collegetuitioncompare.com/trends/lesley-university/cost-of-attendance/?test#COA



https://www.converse.edu/admissions/financial-aid-and-tuition/undergraduate-freshmen-and-transfer-students/2014-15-tuition-reset/tuition-reset-fact-sheet/



https://www.cornerstone.edu/news/cornerstone-university-announces-pricing-restructure-plan-for-traditional-undergraduate-students



https://www.csj.edu/financial-aid/tuitionreset/



https://www.csp.edu/admissions/value/tuition-reset/
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https://www.dcourier.com/news/2013/oct/13/prescott-college-lowers-tuition-school-works-to-b/



https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700202359/Christian-colleges-hurting-for-students.html



(Kottich) https://dspace2.creighton.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10504/115011/Sarah%20Kottich_Final%20Dissertation%20with%20Signatures.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y



https://www.eab.com/blogs/enrollment/2017/10/why-tuition-resets-arent-consistently-successful



https://www.educationdive.com/news/mills-college-president-talks-strategy-higher-ed-costs/519632/



(EDVISORS) https://www.edvisors.com/plan-for-college/money-saving-tips/tuition-cuts/



https://www.elmira.edu/admissions-aid/Tuition_Aid/Tuition_Reset/index.html



https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardvedder/2018/03/22/tuition-resets-and-the-redistribution-of-income/#1a0ca7916ee1



https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/02/09/cleary-university-tuition-public-service-workers/97686246/



https://www.friends.edu/news/2014/12/19/friends-university-addresses-affordability-challenge-with-tuition-reset-strategy/



https://www.greensboro.com/news/schools/greensboro-college-announces-deep-cut-to-tuition/article_362514b1-979a-5078-bb5c-fd5e21f381a1.html



https://www.greensboro.edu/definingthepath/



https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/09/07/sweet-briar-will-reset-tuition



https://www.keloland.com/news/eye-on-keloland/usf-tuition-cut-creates-enrollment-boost/1432221323



https://www.localsyr.com/news/local-news/wells-college-drops-tuition-costs-for-2019-20-school-year-by-10-000/1423331467



https://www.marianuniversity.edu/admission-financial-aid/lowering-tuition/



https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article217814175.html



https://www.michigansthumb.com/news/article/College-Tuition-Cuts-Attract-Students-7359533.php



https://www.mills.edu/news/press-releases/tuition-reduction.php



https://www.mills.edu/tuition-reduction/



(NAICU) https://www.naicu.edu/research-resources/research-projects/enhancing-affordability/tuition-reduction



https://www.narcity.com/news/ontario-students-are-convinced-that-the-10-tuition-cut-will-hurt-them-way-more-than-it-will-help



https://www.news-journal.com/news/2012/apr/18/college-to-reduce-tuition-fees/
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https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/education/article193158704.html



https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/contrarian-college-stjohns.html



https://www.pennlive.com/news/2018/09/tuition_to_be_cut_by_a_third_a.html



https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cornish-college-of-the-arts-announces-it-will-lower-tuition-by-20-percent-300786133.html



https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/cornish-college-of-the-arts-announces-it-will-lower-tuition-by-20-percent-300786133.html



https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/hiwassee-college-out-front--reducing-tuition-by-6000-per-year-193683961.html



https://www.seattletimes.com/business/immaculata-university-to-cut-tuition-by-23-for-2017-18/



https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/archives/2015/11/30/still-seeking-students-burlington-college-cuts-tuition-rate



https://www.thestar.com/politics/provincial/2019/01/15/province-to-cut-tuition-fees-by-10-per-cent.html



https://www.thestate.com/news/local/education/article113907138.html



https://www.usabreakingnews.net/2017/11/university-of-detroit-mercy-cuts-undergrad-tuition-30/



https://www.usciences.edu/news/2017/new-usciences-ad-campaign-supports-tuition-reset.html



https://www.usciences.edu/news/2017/usciences-lowers-tuition-for-fall-2018-incoming-class.html



https://www.usiouxfalls.edu/news-and-events/usf-news-feed/university-of-sioux-falls-announces-tuition-reset



https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/17/colleges-plan-to-cut-tuition-by-nearly-half



https://www.vaildaily.com/news/cmc-to-cut-bachelors-degree-tuition-by-23/



https://www.vermontbiz.com/news/2018/december/12/champlain-college-online-enrollment-jumps-after-adult-tuition-cut-50-percent



https://www.warnerpacific.edu/warner-pacific-cuts-tuition-by-24-percent/



https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/09/16/is-resetting-tuition-the-solution-to-the-broken-college-pricing-model-this-school-think-so/?utm_term=.c8944ce269c0



https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/05/17/its-been-almost-a-year-since-utica-college-abandoned-deep-tuition-discounts-heres-what-happened-after/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.73fb03f47bfb

Appendix B
A single data set was required to perform this study. Below is the data dictionary used with notes regarding variable names, sources, definitions, and modifications to source data.
Table B1
Data dictionary and detailed variable definitions
Measure
Institution ID
UnitID

Variable Name

Source
IPEDS: Institutional
Characteristics

Definition
Identification number used by the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Postsecondary
Education (OPE) to identify schools that have Program Participation Agreements (PPA) so
that its students are eligible to participate in Federal Student Financial Assistance programs
under Title IV regulations. This is a 6-digit number followed by a 2-digit suffix used to
identify branches, additional locations, and other entities that are part of the eligible
institution.
Name of the institution

Institution Name

Institution Name

Year of Reset
Before 2008
Population 100 miles
Population Density within 100
miles
Population 200 miles
Population Density within 200
miles
Percent of 200 in 100
Ratio of 100 in 200
Southwest Census Region

Year of Reset
Before_2008
100Population
100Density

IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
Observation
Calculation
CAPS: U.S. CENSUS
CAPS: U.S. CENSUS

200Population
200Density

CAPS: U.S. CENSUS
CAPS: U.S. CENSUS

PCTof200in100
Ratio100in200
Southwest

Far West Census Region

Far_West

Mideast Census Region

Mid_East

Southeast Census Region

Southeast

Great Lakes Census Region

Great_Lakes

Plains Census Region

Plains

Calculation
Calculation
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics

By Observation or press announcement
If Year of Reset < 2008, Before_2008 = 1, Else Before_2008 = 0
Population within 100 miles circumference of the campus zip code.
Average population density for the area within 100 mils circumference of the campus zip
code.
Population within 100 miles circumference of the campus zip code.
Average population density for the area within 100 mils circumference of the campus zip
code.
PCTof200in100 = 100Population / 200 Population
Ratio100in200 = 100Density / 200Density
Southwest AZ NM OK TX
Far West AK CA HI NV OR WA
Mid East DE DC MD NJ NY PA
Southeast AL AR FL GA KY LA MS NC SC TN VA WV
Great Lakes IL IN MI OH WI
Plains IA KS MN MO NE ND SD
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New England Census Region

New_England

Rocky Mountains Census Region

Rocky_Mountains

Multi-location Census Region

MultiLocation

Tuition and Fees - Year -3

156

New England CT ME MA NH RI VT

TuitionandFees_YMinus3

IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Institutional
characteristics
IPEDS: Student Charges

Tuition and Fees - Year -1

TuitionandFees_YMinus1

IPEDS: Student Charges

The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may
not be the same for all students at
an institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit
hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees
include all fixed sum charges that are
required of such a large proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the
charges is an exception. One year prior to reset.

Tuition and Fees - Year 0

TuitionandFees_Y0

IPEDS: Student Charges

The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may
not be the same for all students at
an institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour basis, the average full-time credit
hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate average tuition. Required fees
include all fixed sum charges that are
required of such a large proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the
charges is an exception. In the first-year at the new reduced rate.

Room and Board - Year -3

RoomandBoard_YMinus3

IPEDS: Student Charges

ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a
typical student sharing a room with one other student.
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of
meals per week. Three years prior to reset.

Room and Board - Year -1

RoomandBoard_YMinus1

IPEDS: Student Charges

ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a
typical student sharing a room with one other student.
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of
meals per week. One year prior to reset.

Rocky Mountains CO ID MT UT WY
Major formally recognized administrative units exist in multiple states.
The amount of tuition and required fees covering a full academic year most frequently
charged to students. These values represent what a typical student would be charged and may
not be the same for all students atan institution. If tuition is charged on a per-credit-hour
basis, the average full-time credit hour load for an entire academic year is used to estimate
average tuition. Required fees include all fixed sum charges that arerequired of such a large
proportion of all students that the student who does not pay the charges is an exception.
Three years prior to reset.
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Room and Board - Year 0

RoomandBoard_Y0

IPEDS: Student Charges

ROOM CHARGES - The charges for an academic year for rooming accommodations for a
typical student sharing a room with one other student.
BOARD CHARGES - The charge for an academic year for meals, for a specified number of
meals per week. During the first-year with the new tuition and fee amount.

Sticker Price - Year -3

StickerPrice_YMinus3

Calculation

StickerPrice_YMinus3 = TuitionandFees_YMinus3 + RoomandBoard_YMinus3

Sticker Price - Year -1

StickerPrice_YMinus1

Calculation

StickerPrice_YMinus1 = TuitionandFees_YMinus1 + RoomandBoard_YMinus1

Sticker price Year 0
Sticker Price Change
Sticker Price Change by Percent

StickerPrice_Y0
StickerPrice_CHG
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT

Calculation
Calculation
Calculation

Applications - Year -3

Apps_YMinus3

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

StickerPrice_Y0 = TuitionandFees_Y0 + RoomandBoard_Y0
StickerPrice_CHG = StickerPrice_Y0 - StickerPrice_YMinus1
StickerPrice_CHG_PCT = (StickerPrice_Y0 - StickerPrice_YMinus1) /
StickerPrice_YMinus1
APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). Three years prior to
reset.

Applications - Year -1

Apps_YMinus1

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). One year prior to the
reset.

Applications - Year 0

Apps_Y0

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

APPLICANT - An individual who has fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be
considered for admission (including payment or waiving of the application fee, if any) and
who has been notified of one of the following actions: admission, nonadmission, placement
on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by applicant or institution). During the year of the
reset.

Applications Trend
Applications Change
Applications Change by Percent

App_Trend
App_CHG
App_CHG_PCT

Calculation
Calculation
Calculation

App_Trend = (Apps_YMinus1 - Apps_YMinus3) / Apps_YMinus3
App_CHG = Apps_Y0 - Apps_YMinus1
App_CHG_PCT = (Apps_Y0 - Apps_YMinus1) / Apps_YMinus1

Admits - Year -3

Admits_YMinus3

Admits - Year -1

Admits_YMinus1

Admits Year 0

Admits_Y0

Admits Trend

Admit_Trend

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores
IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores
IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores
Calculation

ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or
university. Three years prior to the reset.
ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or
university. One year prior to the reset.
ADMISSIONS - Applicants that have been granted an official offer to enroll in a college or
university. During the first-year of the reset.
Admits_Trend = (Admits_YMinus1 - Admits_YMinus3) / Admits_YMinus3

Admit Rate Change

AdmitRate_CHG

Calculation

Admits_CHG = Admits_Y0 - Admits_YMinus1
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Enrolled - Year -3

Enrolled_YMinus3

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied,
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the
summer prior to that fall. Three years prior to a tuition reset.

Enrolled - Year -1

Enrolled_YMinus1

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied,
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the
summer prior to that fall. One year prior to a tuition reset.

Enrolled - Year 0

Enrolled_Y0

IPEDS: Admissions and
Test Scores

The number of first-time, degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who applied,
were admitted, and enrolled (full or part time) at an institution for the most recent fall period
available. Include early decision, early action, and students who began studies during the
summer prior to that fall. During the year of a tuition reset.

Enrolled Trend

Enrolled_Trend

Calculation

Enrolled_Trend = (Enrolled_YMinus1 - Enrolled_YMinus3) / Enrolled_YMinus3

Enrolled Change
Enrolled Change by percent

Enrolled_CHG
Enrolled_CHG_PCT

Calculation
Calculation

Enrolled_CHG = Enrolled_Y0 - Enrolled_YMinus1
Enrolled_CHG_PCT = (Enrolled_Y0 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus1

Yield Rate Change

Yield_CHG

Calculation

Yield_CHG = ((Enrolled_Y0 / Admits_Y0) - (Enrolled_YMinus1/Admits_YMinus1))

Reset Success by Enrollment

Reset_Success_Enrollment

Calculation

Sticker Price Elasticity of
Demand

PED_Sticker

Calculation

If Enrolled_Y0>=(Enrolled_YMinus1*1.05) Then Reset_Success_Enrollment=1, Else
Reset_Success_Enrollment=0
PED_Sticker = ((Enrolled_YMinus3 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus3) /
((StickerPrice_YMinus3 - StickerPrice_YMinus1)/ StickerPrice_Yminus3)

Net Price Elasticity of Demand

PED_Net

Calculation

PED_Net = ((Enrolled_YMinus3 - Enrolled_YMinus1) / Enrolled_YMinus3) /
((NetPrice_YMinus3 - NetPrice_YMinus1)/ NetPrice_Yminus3)

Net First-Year Revenue Change

Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG

Calculation

Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG = (AvgNetPrice_Y0 * Enrolled_Y0) -(AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 *
Enrolled_YMinus1)
Net_Revenue_CHG_PCT = Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG / (AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 *
Enrolled_YMinus1)
If FYNetRevenue_Y0>=(FYNetRevenue_YMinus1*1.05) Then
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue=1, Else Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue=0

Net first-year Revenue Change by Net_FY_TFRevenue_CHG_PCT
Percent
Reset Success by First-Year Net
Reset_Success_FYNetRevenue
Revenue

Calculation
Calculation
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Number of First-Year Enrolled
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid
- Year -3

NumFYRecvIG_Yminus3

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g.,
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the
institution designates the recipient. Three years prior to a tuition reset.

Average first-year Institutional
Grant Aid Amount - Year -3

AvgFYIGAid_YMinus3

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, firsttime degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. Three years prior to a tuition reset.

Number of First-Year Enrolled
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid
- Year -1

NumFYRecvIG_Yminus1

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g.,
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the
institution designates the recipient. One year prior to a tuition reset.

Average first-year Institutional
Grant Aid Amount - Year -1

AvgFYIGAid_YMinus1

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, firsttime degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. One year prior to a tuition reset.

Number of First-Year Enrolled
Receiving Institutional Grant Aid
- Year 0

NumFYRecvIG_Y0

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Number of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were
awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships). Institutional grants - Scholarships
and fellowships granted and funded by the institution and/or individual departments within
the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public service) that may contribute indirectly to the
enhancement of these programs. Includes scholarships targeted to certain individuals (e.g.,
based on state of residence, major field of study, athletic team participation) for which the
institution designates the recipient. During the year of the tuition reset.

Average first-year Institutional
Grant Aid Amount - Year 0

AvgFYIGAid_Y0

IPEDS: Student Financial
Aid and Net Price

Average amount of institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships) awarded to full-time, firsttime degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students. During the year of a tuition reset.

Average Net Price - Year -3

AvgNetPrice_YMinus3

Calculation

AvgNetPrice_YMinus3 = ((TuitionandFees_YMinus3 + RoomandBoard_Minus3) *
Enrolled_YMinus3) - (AvgFYIGAid_YMinus3 * NumFYRecIG_YMinus3)
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Average Net Price - Year -1

AvgNetPrice_YMinus1

Calculation

AvgNetPrice_YMinus1 = ((TuitionandFees_YMinus1 + RoomandBoard_Minus1) *
Enrolled_YMinus1) - (AvgFYIGAid_YMinus1 * NumFYRecIG_YMinus1)

Average Net Price - Year 0

AvgNetPrice_Y0

Calculation

NACUBO Discount Rate - Year 3
NACUBO Discount Rate - Year 1
NACUBO Discount Rate - Year
0
NACUBO Discount Rate Trend

DiscountRate_YMinus3

Calculation

DiscountRate_Prior

Calculation

DiscountRate_Y0

Calculation

DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior

Calculation

NACUBO Discount Rate Change

NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG

Calculation

AvgNetPrice_Y0 = ((TuitionandFees_Y0 + RoomandBoard_Minus3) * Enrolled_Y0) (AvgFYIGAid_Y0 * NumFYRecIG_Y0)
DiscountRate_YMinus3 = (NumFYRecvIG_YMinus3 * AvgFYIGAid_Minus3) /
(Enrolled_Minus3 * TuitionandFees_Minus3)
DiscountRate_Prior = (NumFYRecvIG_YMinus1 * AvgFYIGAid_Minus1) /
(Enrolled_Minus1 * TuitionandFees_Minus1)
DiscountRate_Y0 = (NumFYRecvIG_Y0 * AvgFYIGAid_Y0) / (Enrolled_Y0 *
TuitionandFees_Y0)
DiscountRate_Trend_2YRPrior = (DiscountRate_Prior - DiscountRate_YMinus3) /
DiscountRate_YMinus3
NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG = DiscountRate_Y0 - DiscountRate_YMinus3

NACUBO Discount Rate
Decrease
Percent Pell_ Year -1

NACUBO_DR_DECREASE

Calculation

PercentPell_YearPrior

IPEDS

Percent Pell Change
Percent Pell-Year 0

PercentPell_CHG
PercentPell_Y0

Calculation
IPEDS

PercentPell_CHG = PercentPell_Y0 - PercentPell_YearPrior
Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV,
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses.
During the year of a tuition reset.

Percent Pell - Year 1

PercentPell_Y1

IPEDS

Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV,
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses.
One year following a tuition reset.

If NACUBO_DiscountRate_CHG <0, NACUBO_DR_DECREASE = 1, Else
NACUBO_DR_DECREASE = 0
Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV,
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses.
One year prior to tuition reset.
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Percent Pell - Year 2

PercentPell_Y2

IPEDS

Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV,
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses.
Two years following a tuition reset.

Percent Pell - Year 3

PercentPell_Y3

IPEDS

Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded Pell grants. The Pell Grant program (Higher Education Act of 1965, Title IV,
Part A, Subpart I, as amended.) provides grant assistance to eligible undergraduate
postsecondary students with demonstrated financial need to help meet education expenses.
Three years following a tuition reset.

Retention Rate - Year -1

Retention_YMinus3

IPEDS

The full-time retention rate is the percent of the (fall full-time cohort from the prior year
minus exclusions from the fall full-time cohort) that re-enrolled at the institution as either
full- or part-time in the current year. One year prior to the tuition reset.

Retention Rate - Year 0

Retention_YMinus1

IPEDS

The full-time retention rate is the percent of the (fall full-time cohort from the prior year
minus exclusions from the fall full-time cohort) that re-enrolled at the institution as either
full- or part-time in the current year. During the year of a tuition reset.

Retention Rate Change
Retention_CHG
Debt related to Property Plant and Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_YearPrior
Equipment - Year -1

Calculation
Form 990

Retention_CHG = Retention_Y0 - Retention_YMinus1

Property Plant and Equipment net
of accumulated depreciation Year -1

PropertyPlantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior

Form 990

Permanently restricted net assets
included in total restricted net
assets - Year -1

PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YearPrior

Form 990

Temporarily restricted net assets Year -1
Total unrestricted net assets Year -1
Total net assets - Year -1
Total expenses - Year -1
Total Revenue - Year -1
Debt related to Property Plant and
Equipment - Year -2

TempRestNetAssets_YearPrior

Form 990

TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior

Form 990

TotalNetAssets_YearPrior
TotalExpns_YearPrior
TotalRevenue_YearPrior
Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_YMinus2

Form 990
Form 990
Form 990
Form 990
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Property Plant and Equipment net
of accumulated depreciation Year -2

PropertyPlantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YMinus2

Form 990

Permanently restricted net assets
included in total restricted net
assets - Year -2

PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YMinus2

Form 990

Temporarily restricted net assets Year -2
Total unrestricted net assets Year -2
Total net assets - Year -2
Total expenses - Year -2
Total Revenue - Year -2
Advertising and Promotion Spend
- Year -2
Advertising and Promotion Spend
- Year -1
Change in Advertising and
Promotion Spend
Change in Advertising and
Promotion Spend by Percentage

TempRestNetAssets_YMinus2

Form 990

TotalUnrestNetAssets_YMinus2

Form 990

TotalNetAssets_YMinus2
TotalExpns_YMinus2
TotalRevenue_YMinus2
AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2

Form 990
Form 990
Form 990
Form 990

AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior

Form 990

AdvertsingPromotion_CHG

Calculation

AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT

Calculation

AdvertsingPromotion_CHG = AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2
AdvertsingPromotion_CHG_PCT = (AdvertsingPromotionSpendYearPrior AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2) / AdvertsingPromotionSpend_YMinus2
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Equity_Ratio_YearPrior

163

IPEDS

Equity ratio for public and private-not-for profit institutions using FASB standards is derived
as follows:
Total net assets (F2A06) divided by total assets (F2A02) One year prior to the tuition reset.
Net assets are the excess of assets over liabilities or the residual interest in the institution's
assets remaining after liabilities are deducted. The change in net assets results from revenues,
gains, expenses, and losses. FASB institutions classify net assets into three categories:
permanently restricted, temporarily restricted, and unrestricted. GASB institutions classify
net assets into three categories: invested in capital, net of related debt; restricted (with
separate displays of restricted-expendable and restricted-nonexpendable net assets); and
unrestricted. Although the terms are similar, the composition of the categories of net assets
between FASB and GASB institutions can differ significantly.
Total assets include
a) Cash, cash equivalents, and temporary investments;
b) Receivables (net of allowance for uncollectible amounts);
c) Inventories, prepaid expenses, and deferred charges;
d) Amounts held by trustees for construction and debt service;
e) Long-term investments;
f) Plant, property, and equipment; and,
g) Other assets

Endowment per FTE Student Year -1

EndowmentperFTE_YearPrior

IPEDS

Endowment assets (year-end) per FTE enrollment for public and private not-for-profit
institutions using FASB standards is derived as follows: Endowment assets (year-end)
(F2H02) divided by 12-month FTE enrollment (FTE12MN). One year prior to the tuition
reset. Endowment assets are gross investments of endowment funds, term endowment funds,
and funds functioning as endowment for the institution and any of its foundations and other
affiliated organizations. Endowment funds are funds whose principal is nonexpendable (true
endowment) and that are intended to be invested to provide earnings for institutional use.
Term endowment funds are funds which the donor has stipulated that the principal may be
expended after a stated period or on the occurrence of a certain event. Funds functioning as
endowment (quasi-endowment funds) are established by the governing board to function like
an endowment fund but which may be totally expended at any time at the discretion of the
governing board. These funds represent nonmandatory transfers from the current fund rather
than a direct addition to the endowment fund, as occurs for the true endowment categories.
The full-time-equivalent (FTE) enrollment used is the sum of the institutions’ FTE
undergraduate enrollment and FTE graduate enrollment (as calculated from or reported on
the 12-month Enrollment component) plus the estimated FTE of first-professional students.
Undergraduate and graduate FTE are estimated using 12-month instructional activity (credit
and/or contact hours).
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Operating Reserve Ratio - Year 1

Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior+TempRestNet
Assets - (PropertyPLantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior))/TotExpns_YearPrior

Viability Ratio - Year -1

ViabilityRatio_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

Viability_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior+TempRestNet Assets (PropertyPLantEqpmntNetAccumltd_Depr_YearPrior Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior))/Debt_Property_Plant_Equipment_Year_Prior

Change in Net Assets - Year -1

Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

Operating Margin Ratio - Year -1

Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalNetAssets_YearPrior TotalNetAssets_YMinus2) / TotalNetAssets_YMinus2
Operating_Margin_Ratio_YearPrior = (TotalUnrestNetAssets_YearPrior TotalUnrestNetAssets_YMinus2) / (TotalRevenue_YearPrior ((PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YearPrior PermRestNetAsstsIncldInTotalRestNetAssets_YMinus2) + (TempRestNetAssets_YearPrior
- TempRestNetAssets_YMinus2))

CFI Score - Year -1

FIT_SCORE_CFI_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

FIT_SCORE_CFI_YearPrior = (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .35) +
(ViabilityRatio_YearPrior X .35) + (Change_in_Net_Assets_Ratio_YearPrior X .20) +
(Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .10)

CFI Score Minus Debt - Year -1

FIT_SCORE_CFI_ModifiedNODEBT_YearPrior

Calculation (CFI)

FIT_SCORE_CFI_ModifiedNODEBT_YearPrior = (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X
.55) + (ViabilityRatio_YearPrior X .30) + (Operating_Reserve_Ratio_YearPrior X .15)

Appendix C.
This study makes extensive use of the principle of price elasticity of demand as
applied to sticker price elasticity for first-year students (PED_Sticker), sticker price
elasticity for transfer students (PED_Sticker_XFR) and net price elasticity of first-year
students (PED_Net) as defined in the Definition of Terms and Appendix A. Appendix C
provides further explanation for interpretation of price elasticity using the direct result of
the price elasticity formula rather than the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand
formula which is is standard practice in most economics textbooks.
Price elasticity of demand defined and use of absolute value
Price elasticity of demand (or PED) is a microeconomic principle to quantify the
influence of price changes on demand. Alfred C Marshall, credited with defining the
concept said (2006), “Elasticity of demand may be defined as the percentage change in
quantity demanded to the percentage change in price”. Accordingly, the formula for point
price elasticity is as follows (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988):
PED = Percent change in quantity demanded / Percent change in price
The value of PED can be understood to refer to the percent change in demand for
a 1% increase in price. If a price increases 5% and demand declines 10% as a result, the
value for PED is calculated to be -2. Each 1% increase in price results in a 2% reduction
in demand. Results from the PED formula are negative for most goods in most industries.
Economists refer to price elasticity based on the absolute value of PED, so larger values
indicate a greater level of elastic behavior (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988; Intelligent
Economist, 2019; tutor2u, 2019). As applied to our example, although the results of the
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PED equation is actually -2, economists will say the PED is 2. If PED for a different
good is -3, economists will say PED is higher at 3 even though the result of the PED
equation (-3) is lower than -2.
Ranges of PED linked to strategies to maximize total revenue
Building on this use of absolute value to describe the results of PED, different
ranges for PED imply the need for different strategies to maximize total revenue. Table
30 provides explanations of price elasticity of demand from standard economic textbooks
and online resources which outline PED ranges with associated strategies to maximize
net revenue (Boyes, 2012; Fischer et al., 1988; Intelligent Economist, 2019; tutor2u,
2019):
Table 30
Price elasticity of demand types and strategy implications
Direct
Absolute
Type of
Price
results from
value of
PED
increase will
PED
PED (2)
calculation
(1)
X>0
X<0
Veblen good Increase total
revenue
0
0
Perfectly
Increase total
inelastic
revenue
0 > X > -1
0 < X < 1 Relatively
Increase total
inelastic
revenue

Price
decrease will

Decrease
total revenue
Decrease
total revenue
Decrease
total revenue

Note

Increased demand
with higher prices

Demand decreases
less than results of
increased prices
-1
1
Unit elastic
No effect
No effect
Net revenue the
same, gains from
price increase
offset by lost
volume
-1 > X > ∞
1 < X < ∞ Relatively
Decrease
Increase total Reduction of price
elastic
total revenue revenue
increases total
revenue, price
sensitive
-∞
∞
Perfectly
Eliminate all Unlimited
Theoretical
elastic
total revenue total revenue construct of perfect
competition
Note: (1) Results from PED Calculation in raw form. (2) Economists typically speak of PED using
absolute value.
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Confounding the issue of Veblen goods
Veblen goods are special product categories where higher prices signal exclusivity
which is itself valuable. These product categories are exceptional in that they have
positive results for PED which could be confusing to readers who are familiar with the
typical convention of referring to PED as an absolute value of the negative ratio.
Restated, if a price increase of 2% results in a 4% increase in enrollment, the raw result
of PED is +2 which is a result in the Veblen effect range. Multiple studies suggest higher
education pricing can reflect Veblen effects (Lambert, 1999; McConnell et al., 2018).
Conventions in this study
This study will use the direct results of the PED formula when providing results
from Sticker price elasticity and net price elasticity. While acknowledging this is a break
from convention commonly used in economics, it will allow for clearer interpretation of
results where ranges of results may contrast populations that respond to price increases in
both positive and negative patterns.

